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COPYRIGHT, COMPROMISE, AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Jessica D. Litman t
Copyright law gives authors a "property right." But what kind
of property right? Indeed, a property right in what? The answers to
these questions should be apparent from a perusal of title seventeen
of the United States Code-the statute that confers the "property"
right.' Courts, however, have apparently found title seventeen an
unhelpful guide. For the most part, they look elsewhere for answers, relying primarily on prior courts' constructions of an earlier
2
and very different statute on the same subject.
When Congress enacted the 1976 General Revision of Copyright Law (1976 Act), 3 the courts had been deciding copyright cases
for more than sixty years under a statute enacted in 1909 (1909
5
Act).4 Although the 1909 Act had been outmoded for a long time,
various general revision bills introduced between 1924 and 1974
had failed.; The 1909 Act's ambiguity had required judicial interpretation and interpolation, 7 and years of technological developt
Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1974, Reed CollegeM.F.A. 1976, Southern Methodist University;J.D. 1983 Columbia Law School. The author thanks Jonathan Weinberg, John NI. Kernochan, and Irwin Karp, her colleagues
Fred Schauer, Ed Cooper, Becky Eisenberg, Sally Payton, Avery Katz, Michael Rosenzweig, Lee Bollinger, Doug Kahn, and James B. White for their helpfil comments on
earlier versions of this article, and thanks Kathy West for tireless, last-minute assistance.
!
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2 See, e.g.. Rockford Map Publishers. Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel. Inc.. 738
F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Topolos v. Caldewey. 698 F.2d 991
(9th Cir. 1983); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.. 552 F. Supp. 8)
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
:1 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
4 Copyright Act of March 4. 1909, 35 Stat. 1075. repealed by 1976 General Revision
of Copyright Iaw, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
5 See Ringer.
t, ThoitghL on the Copyqrit,I. of 1976. 22 N.Y.L. Sti. I. Rv:\'. 477,
479 (1977).
6
A. GOILDM.XN.
HIE -IISTORY oF COIPyRIGHIT I.\W R:.vIsION FROM 1901 "to 1954 4II (1955), reprinted in StcotMN. O,\ P.wNts. TR.I.RMARKS, .NI Col'VRIc.rr's OF ilI StiN.vr: CoN[.\[. ONIE JtJlU(IARY. 86iTI- CONG., IST SEISS.. COt'iirr LAW REVISION (Com .
Prim 1960).
7 See B. KAIIL. AN UNitURIED VItV OF COPYRIGIrr 40-41 (1967):
Ii[he statute, like its predecessors. leaves the development of fuindaientals to the .judges. Indeed the courts have had to be consulted at nearly
every point, fbr the text of the statute has a maddeningly casual prolixity
and imprecision throughout. One takes 1909 as a starting place not
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ment had made the need for judicial creativity acute.8

Courts

"stretched the limits of statutory language" in order to make the
obsolete 1909 Act serviceable.!' By the time Congress replaced the
1909 Act, courts had embroidered the old statute with a wealth of

common law interpretation.' 0
The common law of statutory copyright possessed a number of

strengths and some unsurprising weaknesses. Like many bodies of
judge-made law, the common law doctrines were often inconsistent
and contradictory, not only among courts but within courts; not
only among lines of cases, but within lines of cases.' I The law was
riddled with analytically indefensible distinctions, impractical definitions, and wholesale distortion of statutory language.12 It was none3
theless a magnificent edifice.'
In 1976, Congress replaced that edifice with a very different
kind of statute. Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer described
the new statute this way:
The revisions contained in the New Act are certainly "general" in
scope; they substantially revise the provisions of that antiquated
law under which we have been struggling to operate for sixty
years .... But the New Act is not a "general revision" in the same
sense that the 1909 Act was, i.e., a bringing together of scattered
statutory provisions with relatively few changes or innovations.
The New Act is rather a completely new copyright statute, inmerely because of the fact of recodification, but because there was
thenceforth a crowding of suggestive case law.
See also Henn, Cassandra Considers Copyright, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 453, 460 (1978).
8

See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831,

H.R. 6835 Before the Subcomm. on Cowrts, Civil Libeities, and the Administration ofJustice of the
HonseJndiciar' Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings]
(testimony of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).
S

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BRIEFING PAPERS ON CURRENT ISSUES,

reprinted in Copy-

right Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Snbcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration ofjustice of the HonseJdiciay Comntn., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2053 (1975)
[hereinafter 1975 Honse Hearings].
1o See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, stipra note 7, at 41. I use the term "common law" to describe
the judge-made law of statutory copyright to emphasize that, by the early 1970s, much
of the judicial doctrine was both independent of and apparently unconnected with the
language of the 1909 Act.
I
See generally B. KAPILAN, supra note 7, at 79-97. An example appearing often in the
legislative history of the 1976 Act is the courts' various treatments of the concept of
publication. See, e.g.. HOUSE COIM. ON TIlE JUDICIARY. 89TII CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LA\V REVISION PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON TIE GENERAL. REVISION OF TIE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BI.I. 81 (Comm.
Print 1965) [hereinafter REGISTER'S SUPPLEIMENTARY REPORT] ("The present situation is

chaotic, and it is becoming worse all the time.").
12 See B. K.xPIAN, sntpra note 7, at 81-82 ("Judges, however, who in recent times have
inclined against brutality, have run the risk of appearing slightly ridiculous in their tortuous interpretations.").

1:
See. e.g.. Bleistein v. )onaldson I.thographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes.
J.); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand..J.).
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tended to deal with a whole range of problems undreamed of by
the drafters of the 1909 Act. Even more important, the new statute makes a number of fundamental changes in the American
copyright system, including some so profound that they may mark
a shift in direction for the very philosophy of copyright itself.
Properly designated, the New Act is not a "general revision," but
is as radical a departure as was our first copyright statute, in
1790.14
Unlike the porous 1909 Act, the 1976 Act is a detailed comprehen5
sive code, chock-full of specific, heavily negotiated compromises.'
Some of the 1976 Act's provisions purport to adopt common law
doctrine;' 6 others purport to abrogate it.'

7

Were the new code less complicated or its legislative history
less impenetrable, its passage might have ended the story. Huge
portions of the judge-made federal common law of statutory copyright would have passed into the twilight zone occupied by, for example, the pre-Erie1 8 federal common law of unfair competition.1 9
A decade after passage of the 1976 Act, however, the decided cases
manifest judicial reluctance to abandon prior doctrine.
In Rockford M1lap Publishers,Inc. v. Directoty Service Co., 20 for example, the Seventh Circuit relied exclusively on 1909 Act case law in
holding that the copyright in a map compiled entirely from public
domain sources was infringed by a second map publisher's incorporation of information from the first map into its own maps.
Although the 1976 Act addresses the copyrightability of informaRinger, supra note 5, at 479 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Melvin Nimmer wrote of the 1976 Act:
Where previously the statute had too little to say in many vital copyright
areas, it may now be argued that it says too much. I for one regret this
departure from the flexibility and pristine simplicity of a corpus of judgemade copyright law implanted upon a statutory base consisting of general
principles. This has now been replaced with a body of detailed rules reminiscent of the Internal Revenue Code.
I M. NIMMER, NIMER ON CoPYRIGHT vi (1978); accord Henn, supra note 7. at 459-64.
16 E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982) (first sale doctrine); see H.R. Ri.w. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5659. 5693 ("Section 109(a) restates and confirms the principle that. where the copyright owner has
transferred ownership of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to
whom the copy or phonorecord is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale. rental.
or any other means.").
17 E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "perforin"); H.R. REi-. No. 1476. ,/upra note
16, at 63. reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE Coo;. & AlI[N. NEws at 5676-77. See generally
Ringer. supra note 5.
1
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
E
D
Sete. e.g.. WVilliam R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 265 U.S. 526 (1924). Some
l)re-Efi cases remain influential to state and federal courts. St't' rgenrally Note, The Problent o F inelional Feath,: 7)ad Dress htfin,,gemient under Section 43(a) of Ike Lanhan .lct. 82
Coy.um. I. Ri.:v. 77 (1982).
20 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985). cerl. denied. 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
14

15
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tion,21 the court apparently found it unnecessary to consult

it.--22

Similarly, in National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet,InC., 23 the
court relied on what it regarded as a century-long tradition of protecting data contained in compilations, as well as the mode in which
the data were expressed,2 4 to hold that the copyright in a directory
extended to the information it contained, 25 notwithstanding statu'6
tory language to the contrary.
In Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Electronics,2 7 the court analyzed the
copyright statute's pre-emptive effect on state misappropriation
doctrine without examining or citing the 1976 Act's express preemption provisions. 28 Instead, the court relied on pre-1976
Supreme Court cases that analyzed pre-emption in broad policy
terms. In Topolos v. Caldewey, 29 the Ninth Circuit applied older case
law to determine which copyright claims came within its federal subject matter jurisdiction. 30 Although the 1976 Act contains substantive and procedural provisions that fundamentally alter that
inquiry,3 ' the court ignored them.
In large part, the courts' persistent reliance on older precedent
reflects a genuine and understandable confusion about how to interpret the 1976 Act. The statute is complicated and its language is
often unclear.3 2 Courts consult the statute's legislative history for
33
guidance, but find that it compounds their confusion.
Indeed, the statute's legislative history is troubling because it
reveals that most of the statutory language was not drafted by memSee 17 U.S.C. § 102.
See also Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding telephone directory copyrightable without mention of § 102(b)).
23
552 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Il1. 1982).
24 Id. at 94.
25
The court explained: "If... protection is limited solely to the form of expression. the economic incentives underlying the copyright laws are largely swept away.
Recognizing this, the courts have long afforded protection under the Copyright laws
against appropriation of the fruits of the compiler's industry." Id. at 92.
26
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
27
564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983).
28
See 17 U.S.C. § 301.
29 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983).
:o Id. at 993-95.
31
17 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301, 501.
312
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (preemption of state law). Reams have been written
21

22

about section 301's ambiguity. See. e.g., Abrams. Copyright, Misappropriation and Preemplion: Constitutional and Stalulory Limils of State Lail Protection, 1983 Su'. CT. RiN'. 509
(1983); Gorman, Fact or Fancy. the Implicationsfor Copyright, 29 J. Cot'RIGHr Soc'v 560.
(308-10 (1982): Shipley & Hay. Protectiq Research: (opyrighl. common-Lan Alternatives and
Federal Preemption. 63 N.C.L. RF-'. 125, 164-67 (1984), Note, Copyright I reemption: E[fcting
the .lnalysis Prescribedby Section 301. 24 B.C.I.. RE\'. 963 (1983): Comment, The Fine Art of
Preemptitn: Section 301 anid the Copyright Act of 1976. 60 Oiz. .. Ri.'. 287 (1981).
3:5 See. e.g.. Burroughs v. Metro-Coldwyn-Mayer, Inc.. 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1981):

Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
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bers of Congress or their staffs at all. Instead, the language evolved
through a process of negotiation among authors, publishers, and
other parties with economic interests in the property rights the statute defines. 3 4 In some cases, affected parties agreed upon language,
which was then adopted by Congress, while disagreeing about what
the language meant.3 5 So it is perhaps understandable that some

courts have preferred to interpret the 1976 Act as if it had made no
change in the 1909 Act, for which, at least, there are precedents. 6
But it would be a mistake to conclude that simply because the statutory language and legislative history are difficult to interpret, they
convey nothing about what the 1976 Act was intended to accomplish. The statute was a complicated and delicate compromise, but
the nature of most aspects of that compromise is possible to
unearth. Examination of recent cases in light of that knowledge
reveals that courts' reliance on inapposite precedent has seriously
distorted the statute and the subtle compromises it incorporates.3 7
34 See infra notes 83-151 and accompanying text. See generally Feist, The Copyright
Client, 26 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 437 (1979); Ringer, supra note 5, at 481-82.
35 See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1789-94 (testimony of Barbara Ringer,
Register of Copyrights, on negotiations among authors, publishers and educators lead-

ing to the language of section 107 and its accompanying legislative history). See also U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF TIE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1975 REVISION BILL 1789-94

(1975) [hereinafter REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]; j fra notes 118-30 and
accompanying text. Compare 1975 House Hearings at 295 (testimony of Harry Rosenfield
for Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations) with id. at 345
(testimony of Ernest Farmer for Music Publishers Association).
36 See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551-53 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Snpp. 828 (D. Colo.

1985); Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471 (1). Nev. 1983).
37 See infra notes 242-84 and accompanying text. In two recent decisions, for example, the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit unraveled complicated compromises
involving various aspects of copyright ownership. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder. 469

U.S. 153 (1985); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.). cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). For a discussion of these cases see infra text accompanying

notes 266-82. For a detailed discussion of the compromises see infra notes 54-67. 20235 and accompanying text. In two other cases, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), and Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984), the Supreme Court adopted a test for fair use that rigidilies the statute's major flexibility principle. See infra text accompanying notes 261-65 The Supreme
Court's decisions have met with much criticism. See generally Civil and CriminalEnforcemenl
of the Copyright Laws: Hearings on the .lthorily and Responsibiliv of the FederalGovernuent to
Protect Intellectual Property Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrighls and Trademarks y'the Seiiale Comnt. on theJntdiriaq,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 89-95 (1985) Ilhereinafter Civilapid
(1 riinal Enforcenentl (testimony of Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights) (criticizing
11lls Musie); W. PATRY, LvrMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAw 113 (2d ed. 1986) (criticizing

.Mills.1hlsic); Abrahms, lI'hos Sorry ANow? Termination Rights and the Derivathe lorks Exceplion. 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985) (criticizing .ills .iusi); Francione. Facingthe .Vation:
The Standardsfor Copyright, hIfringement, and Fair Ive of Facial W'orks. 134 U. P.%. L. REv.
519 (1986) (criticizing Hmper & Row). But see Kernochan, Protection of Unpnlblished WForks
h the United States Before anid .Jfler the A'ation Case, 33J. COPYRIGIrr Soc'v 322 (1986) (argu-
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This article examines the unusual legislative history of the 1976
Copyright Act. That legislative history reflects an anomalous legislative process designed to force special interest groups to negotiate
with one another.3 8 Courts and commentators frequently seek guidance from this legislative history," J but find it difficult to interpret
because it is not the sort of legislative history they are used to interpreting. In this article, I first explore why the 1976 Act's legislative
history is not amenable to the usual methods of interpretation. Second, I examine what this legislative history reveals about congressional intent and about the meaning of the statutory language. The
legislative materials disclose a process of continuing negotiations
among various industry representatives, designed and supervised by
Congress and the Copyright Office and aimed at forging a modern
copyright statute from a negotiated consensus. During more than
twenty years of negotiations, the substantive content of the statute
emerged as a series of interrelated and dependent compromises
among industries with differing interests in copyright. The record
demonstrates that members of Congress chose to enact compromises whose wisdom they doubted because of their belief that, in
this area of law, the solution of compromise was the best solution. I
examine the legislative materials detailing some of those compromises in order to learn what the persons who negotiated them
believed them to mean. Finally, I argue that courts' resort to 1909
Act precedent whenever they find the statute ambiguous disserves
Congress's intent and distorts the compromises embodied in the
language of the statute.
I
SEARCHING FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT

[T]he bill is so full of things that people do not understand about
it, that cannot be understood, it should not be passed. There are
ing that although laper & Row distorts the statute, the result is an improvement over
1976 Act).
38 See infra notes 81-151 and accompanying text; 1965 House learigs. supra note 8,
at 1872-73 (testimony of'Abrahain Kaminstein, Register ofCopyrights). Ahhong-h negotiation and compromise coninonly accompany legislation, itis rare that Congress designs, funds and supervises third-party negotiations in a [brui that generates an ollicial
record of the bargaining. See infra note 83; infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
3 .See. e.g,,
National Football Ieagtme v. McBee & Bruno's. Inc.. 792 F.2d 726. 732
(8th Cir. 1986); Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs. v. Continental Homes, Inc.. 785 F.2d
897, 905 (1 lth (it-.
1986): M. Kramer INMt.Co. v. Andrews. 783 F.2d 421.433-34 (4th
Cir. 1986): Hasbro Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189. 193 (2d (it.1985):
Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.. 773 F.2d 411. 416-18 (2d (ir. 1985):
Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 158-59 (3d (it-.
1984); G'ay
Toys, Inc. v.Buddy 1. Corp., 703 F.2d 970. 972-73 (6th Cir. 1983): Schnapper v.Foley.
667 F.2d 102. 114-15 (D.C. (it-.
1981). crmt.
denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982): Triangle Publications. Inc. %.Knight-Ridder Newspapers. Inc., 626 F.2d 1171. 1174 (5th (it-.
1980).
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a lot of people who have instigated and brought about this bill
which is being presented to us. I have talked to members of the
Committee on the Judiciary who admit they do not know what is
in it.

40
Representative Paul C. Jones

Most analyses of a statute's legislative history seek either to determine a legislature's specific intent with respect to a narrow substantive issue 4 ' or to support an argument that a legislature
specifically intended a particular result. 4 2 Such analyses of the 1976
Copyright Act's legislative history have failed to clarify the statute's
ambiguity. 43 The legislative history of the 1976 Act contains little
evidence of Congress's specific intent on any substantive issue.
Courts searching for such evidence have ultimately relied upon an
assortment of often conflicting inferences drawn from the absence
of such evidence.
In Mills Music v. Snyder,44 for example, the Supreme Court
scoured the 1976 Act's legislative history to discern Congress's specific intent regarding the scope of the derivative works exception to
the termination of transfers provisions in section 304(c). 45 The
Court split five to four, with both the majority and the dissent relying heavily on section 304(c)'s legislative history. 4 6 Each insisted
113 CONG. REC. 8581 (1967).
See, e.g., Abrahms, supra note 37, at 204-32.
See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association of American Publishers, Inc. at 78, 10 & n.7, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No.
83-1632).
43 Compare, e.g., Roth v. Pritkin, 710 F.2d 934 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961
(1983) with Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
44 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
45 Under the 1976 Act:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its
termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after
the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work covered by the terminated grant.
17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (1982). The Act's termination provisions are very complex.
and the reader needs no further familiarity with their terms. The curious, however, may
be interested that section 304 extended the term of subsisting copyrights for an additional 19 years. Subsection 304(c) permitted authors to recapture the rights protected
by the extended term and subsection 304(c)(6)(A) exempted from the rights reverting to
the author the right to continue to use a derivative work prepared under a terminated
grant. See generally Curtis, Caveat Emptor in Copyright: .A PracticalGuide to the Termination of
Transfer Provisionsof the .'a, Copyright Code, 25 Bum.. COPYRIGrr SoC'Y 19 (1977); Rothenberg, Old Copyrights, Old Copyright Lartyer and the Nen, Coyright.1ct, 29J. Com'R, GmT Soc'"
395, 396-99 (1982). The Court in .Mills Music held that the § 304(c)(6)(A) exemption
protected the interest of intermediate transferees in receiving the proceeds friom the
derivative work's further exploitation rather than subjecting that interest to the author's
right of recapture. 469 U.S. at 164.
46
Conpare 469 U.S. at 170-76 (majority opinion) with id. at 180-88 (White. .,
dissenting).
40
41
42
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that an exegesis of the legislative history led inexorably to its conclusion. Neither the majority nor the dissent, however, could cite
evidence that any member of Congress had ever considered the issue before the Court. Instead, both relied upon inferences drawn
from congressional silence, and upon assumptions about matters
within congressional knowledge. 47 Professor Abrahms' recent analysis of 1lills M1,usic takes this approach a step further. He concludes
that the dissent was probably correct because "Congress accepted
the position of the Register of Copyright on those issues [upon]
which it did not formulate a position of its own, ' 48 and, although
the "Register never directly announced a position on the issue," the
Register attended discussions among industry representatives during which the issue was raised. 4 11 All three analyses contain a thorough review of such evidence as the legislative history contains, and
all three confess the absence of evidence of any substantive intent on
the part of any member of Congress. All three, nonetheless, conclude that Congress can be deemed to have intended something in
particular and engage in convoluted logical maneuvers to infer what
that something in particular might be.
Several assumptions underlie such an exercise. First, these
analyses assume that legislative intent must refer to the intent of
members of Congress. Second, they assume that this intent must be
substantive and specific. Third, they assume that in the absence of
evidence of substantive, specific intent on the part of members of
Congress, it is appropriate to impute an intent to Congress that is
both substantive and specific. 50 All three assumptions are particu47 Compare id. at 172 (majority opinion) ("Rather than assmning that Congress was
we think it more probable that Congress saw no
unaware of a common practice . .
reason to draw a distinction between a direct grant by an author to a party that produces
derivative works and a situation in which a middleman is given atthority to make sulbsequent grants to sttch producers.") with id. at 181 (Whitc.J., dissenting) ("The Committee apparently assumed that the grantee of the underlying copyright and the utilizer of
the derivative work would be one and the same.").
48 Abrahins. su/na note 37. at 228.
41) Id. at 228-32. Former Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer, who actually
drafted the provision, recently testified befbre a Senate Subcommittee about her recollection as to Congress's intent. See Civil and (:iinihial Enfiu'nIce.
supra note 37. at 79-95.
50
Ihese assutmptions arise hecause legislative "'intent" is essentially a legal fiction.
For purposes of'interpretation, cotrts alld commentators assllle that neblers

of Coll-

gress write statutes, that they know what the stattites say. and that they intend something
in particular to Follow front the language they choose. The nmost cursory familiaritv with
tile usual legislative process. however. indicates that these assumlptions describe the process poorly. Indeed, uch of'courts" and commentators" discomiort with tie concept of
legislative intent derives friom an awareness that the concept is a fiction. See generally
Ma\acCalhtn. LeiMati'e hnieat. 75 Y.\ur 1.4. 754 (1966). In the typical case. however, this
discomnlbrt lessens because most legislative histories do not expressly contradict the
usual assumptions about legislative intent. In this regard. the 1976 Copyright Act is
very dif rent from most statutes.
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larly difficult to apply to the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright
Act. The official legislative history is long, comprising more than 30
studies, three reports issued by the Register of Copyrights, four
panel discussions issued as committee prints, six series of subcommittee hearings, 18 committee reports, and the introduction of at
5
least 19 general revision bills over a period of more than 20 years. '
Yet one can read this history in its entirety and find no evidence that
any member of Congress intended anything in particular to follow
from many provisions of the statute. Indeed, even the sponsors of
copyright revision demonstrated little knowledge and few opinions
52
about the substance of the bills they introduced.
The legislative history of section 304(c), the provision at issue
in Mills ,Mhusic, is illustrative.5 3 That provision was part of a compromise package involving the controversial and intertwined issues of
54
initial ownership, duration of copyright, and reversion of rights.
51

See 1 A.

LTMAN & J. LIGHTSTONE, THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PRO-

JEC-I: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT

AcT- oF 1976 xxxi-xliii (1981). The Kaminstein Project is a six volume index to more
than 160 items of legislative history. Much of the legislative history is collected in the
scventeen-volunc nmicrofiche compilation G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION

(1976), which comprises 143 microfiche cards.
52
Representative Celler, who introduced H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964),
rep) inted in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89THt CONG., lST SESS., COPYRIGHT L W
REVISIoN P.\RT 5: 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS 1 (Comm. Print
1965) [hereinafter CLR PART 5] at the Register's request, made a general but atypically
substantive statement before the House subcommittee during the 1965 House Hearings.
See 1965 House hearings, supra note 8, at 1851-55. More frequently, sponsors disclaimed
specific positions on the hills they introduced. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hlearings
on . 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the
Juduiay. 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (remarks of
Sen. McClellan, sponsor of S. 1006). See also Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597
Before the Subconnm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm,,. on the Judicialy,
90th Cong.. 1st Sess. 1, 172-75 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings] (remarks of
Sen. McClellan, sponsor of S. 597). Moreover, sponsors of amendments displayed remarkable inexpertise regarding the subject matter of their amendments; that inexpertise
plagued even the members of the subcommittees responsible for copyright revision. See.
e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1285 (remarks of Rep. Danielson, sponsor of
H.R. 5345, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at

80).
53
54

See supra note 45.
See REGISTER'S SUPPI.EMENTARY REI'ORT, supra note 1I, at 66-68, 71-76. 86-96;

1965 House Hearings. suna note 8, at 129-36 (testimony of Horace Manges, American
Book Publishers Council); id. at 994 (prepared statement of Motion Picture Association).
For a taste of the controversy, see HousE COMM. ON TiE JUDICIARY, 88r1 CON(;., I sr
SESS., COPYRIGIrI LAW REvISION PART 2: DISCUSSION ANt) CoMMNIErrs ON RFPORr OF TIE
RE;ISTER OF COPYIGIrrS ON TIE GENERAl. REVISION OF TIHE U.S. COPYRIGIT IAw 93-94

(Comm. Print 19(63) 1hereinafter CIR PART 21; HoUSE COMM. ON TIIEJUDICIARY. 88"ri
CONG., 2n SESS., COPYRIGIT LAW REVISION PART 3: PREI.IMINARY DRAI.-r AND DISCUSSION

,\ND COMMENTS 262-63 (Comm. Print 1964) 1hereinafter CI.R PART 31 (remarks of Irwin
Karp, Authors League of America) id. at 278-90 (colloquy); Hot'sE COMM. ON TIIIEJUDICIARY, 88Tn CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGIr IAv REVISION PART 4: FtRTHER DISCUSSION
AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGIHT IAW 34 (Comm.

866

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:857

The Register, convinced that opposition to any provision of the Revision Bill would scuttle the proposed legislation, 5-5 drafted a
number of alternative proposals designed to achieve an acceptable
compromise. 56 Each proposal, however, met with more opposition
57
than its predecessor.
Print 1964) [hereinafter CLR PART 4] (remarks of Horace MangesJoint Copyright Committee of the American Book Publishers Council and the American Textbook Publishers
Institute).
55 See, e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 52, at 219-20 (remarks of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights).
56 Under the 1909 Act, copyrights had an initial 28-year term and could be renewed
for an additional 28-year term. One purpose of the renewal term was reversion of rights
to the author; unless the work was a "work made for hire," the renewal term vested in
the work's author notwithstanding any grants made during the initial term. However, in
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943), the Supreme Court
held an author's expectation of a renewal term assignable, effectively gutting the reversionary feature of renewal. SeeJ. GUINAN, DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 77-79 (1957) reprinted
ill SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE

JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION (1960).

Initially, the Register proposed retaining renewal, but extending the renewal term
from 28 to 48 years and eliminating its reversionary feature. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 53-58 (Comm.

Print 1961) [hereinafter CLR PART 1]. Subsisting copyrights already in their renewal
term would be extended for 20 additional years but the extended term would revert to
the work's author. Id. The Register favored replacing reversion with a time limit of 20
years on lump-sum transfers. Id. at 92-94. Based upon a study ofjudicial decisions that
had concluded that works made for hire included works created by salaried employees
but not commissioned works, see B. VARMER, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION 142 (1958), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th CONG, 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION

(1960), the Register proposed defining works made for hire to include works prepared
by employees and to exclude commissioned works. See CLR PART 1, supra, at 90-91.
Because employers were deemed the "authors" of works made for hire, the reversion of
the extended term and the time limitation on lump-sum transfers would not have affected works for hire.
The response to these proposals was generally negative. See sources cited infra note
57. Almost no one agreed with the recommendation to retain renewal. Representatives
of publishers and motion picture studios insisted that industry practice identified various
commissioned works as works for hire and opposed the proposed definition as well as
the extended duration and time limitation on transfers. The Register next proposed an
extended single term with two alternative provisions permitting an author either to recapture the copyright after 25 years or to recover a share of the grantee's profits after 20
years. The Register also proposed a revised definition of works made for hire that included commissioned works. This proposal met an even more ardently negative response. The Register's third proposal, in 1964, more closely resembled the scheme
ultimately enacted in 1976, including a single term of life plus 50 years, a provision for
terminating grants after 35 years, and a parallel provision for recapture of the extended
term of subsisting copyrights. Opposition, however, remained strong.
57 See CLR PART 2, supra note 54, at 88-104 (opposition to retaining renewal); id. at
104-05 (opposition to limiting duration of transfers); id. at 153-60 (opposition to excluding commissioned works from works made for hire); CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 25775 (argument over revised definition of works made for hire); id. at 278-92 (opposition
to reversion); CLR PART 4, supra note 54, at 248-50 (written comments of American
Book Publishers Council on reversion, duration, and works made for hire); id. at 313-14
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Finally, the Copyright Office succeeded in urging negotiations
among representatives of authors, composers, book and music publishers, and motion picture studios that produced a compromise on
the substance and language of several provisions.5 8 The compromise provisions appeared in H.R. 4347, and were presented to the
House subcommittee as such. 5:1 The prepared testimony of the Motion Picture Association of America, for example, described the provisions this way:
After much travail and debate for several years, at panel
meetings, symposia, and ad hoc meetings, through published papers and articles, but with a joint desire to promote copyright revision, substantial changes were made in the original proposals by
way of major compromises worked out under the guidance and
assistance of the Copyright Office. These are reflected in H.R.
4347.
As presently drawn in H.R. 4347, the compromise provisions
on "works for hire," and on "recapture," provide a minimal basis
on which motion picture interests can learn to live with these provisions, and can accept the same in the interests of promoting revision legislation, even though we are still strongly opposed in
principle to the whole concept of recapture.
Any change or dilution to our disadvantage of the minimal
basis on which these compromise provisions were found acceptable, in the interests of furthering acceptable copyright revision,
would be working an injustice, and we would strongly oppose the
o
same. 6
Once the compromise had been incorporated into the bill, most
(written comments of Authors League of America on works made for hire); CLR PART 5,
supra note 52, at 146-50 (opposition to new, revised definition of works made for hire);
i. at 154-65 (opposition to new, revised, reversion provision).
58 See 1965 House Hearings,supra note 8, at 107 (testimony of Irwin Karp, Authors
League of America); id. at 129 (testimony of Horace Manges, American Book Publishers
Council); id. at 134-36 (Memorandum of American Book Publishers Council, Inc.. American Guild of Authors & Composers, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, American Textbook Publishers Institute, The Authors League of America, Inc.,
Composers and Lyricists Guild of America, Inc., Music Publishers Protected Association, Inc., Music Publishers Association of the United States Re: H.R. 4347); i. at 257
(testimony ofTom Mahoney, Society of Magazine Writers); id. at 1048-49 (testimony of
Adolph Schimel, Motion Picture Association of America).
59 See, e.g., 1965 House learings,sutpra note 8, at 92. 98 (statement of Rex Stout for
the Authors League of America); id. at 107 (testimony of Irwin Karp, Authors .League of
America); id. at 257 (testimony of Tom Mahoney, Society of Magazine Writers): id. at
1866 (testimony of Abrahamn Kaninstein, Register of Copyrights). See also REGISTERS
SECONI StI'I'I.EMIN'IrAI" Rm'owr, supra note 35, at 296-307.
6o
1965 Home hearings,supra note 8, at 994 (prepared statement of the Motion Picture Association of America). See also id. at 1537-38 (testimony of.Joseph l)ubin, American Patent Law Association); 1967 Senale Hearings. supra note 52, at 74 (testimony of
Horace Manges, American Book Publishers Council).
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of the once-bitter controversy evaporated 6 ' and the provisions re-

ceived little congressional attention. Over the next ten years several
witnesses appeared before Congress with proposals to vary the
package.152 The Registers 63 of Copyrights, however, consistently advised Congress to resist suggestions to alter the terms of the compromise." 4 Congress enacted the relevant provisions essentially
without change.
Close examination of the dialogue preceding the 1965 compromise reveals what the negotiating parties believed their compromise
to mean. 6 5 The Register's few remarks seem at least mildly confir-

matory. 6 6 Because the controversy surrounding the provisions disappeared once the parties reached a compromise, however,
Congress gave the provisions little or no detailed consideration, and
addressed them only briefly in committee reports. The Register's
reports and testimony on these provisions were equally superficial. 6 7 Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever of what members of

Congress believed the language to mean. And although the prelegislative dialogue reveals the extent to which the industry representatives believed that their compromise altered prior law, 68 later
legislative materials gave the compromise little explicit attention.
61 See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 1866 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights); 1967 Senate Hearings,supra note 52, at 74 (testimony of Horace
Manges, American Book Publishers Council); see generally Lehman, Legislative Background,
25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 192 (1978).
62 See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings,supra note 8, at 264-71 (testimony of Leonard Zissu,

Composers & Lyricists Guild, proposing replacing works made for hire provision with
"shop right" provision); 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 133-34 (testimony of Irvin
Goldblum, Department of Justice, proposing shorter duration of copyright term and
altered termination of transfer provisions).
63 During the 21 year revision process, three persons held the office of Register of
Copyrights. Abraham Kaminstein served until his retirement in 1971, when George
Cary took over. Cary retired in 1973 and Barbara Ringer became Register. Kaminstein
and Ringer were both active and extremely influential in the revision effort.
64 See 1965 House Hearings, snpra note 8, at 1866 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights); REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at
306-07 (opposing alteration of "carefully negotiated definition" of works made for hire
or first refusal exception in section 203, "one of the compromises on which the delicate
balance of section 203 rests").
65 See inf a notes 202-35 and accompanying text. With respect, for example, to the
provision at issue in Mills ,lfusic permitting the continued exploitation of a derivative
work, it appears that all parties believed that termination pursuant to the provision
would divest intermediary grantees, such as music publishers, of any rights whatsoever.
See infra note 226.
66 See, e.g., REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPI.EMEN-IARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 299; see
also CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 278 (remarks of Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register of
Copyrights for Examining); Civil and CriminalEnforcement, supra note 37, at 90 (testimony
of Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights).
67 See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, stipra note 9, at 1889-91 (testimony of Barbara
Ringer, Register of Copyrights).

68

See infa notes 210-35 and accompanying text.
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If the paucity of congressional participation in framing the substantive terms of the provisions concerning initial ownership, duration, and termination of transfers were unique to these provisions,
the problem of interpreting the statute as a whole would be a familiar and manageable one. 69 Instead, the pattern underlying the
adoption of these provisions pervades the 1976 Act. Most of the
statute's substantive provisions derive from compromises negotiated among those with economic interests in copyright: the stat7
ute's treatment of cable television, 70 library photocopying, '
phonorecord publishing, 7 2 jukebox operation, 7 3 and the manufacturing clause 7 4 resulted from verbatim congressional adoption of
such negotiated compromises. The wording of the fair use provision, and the language of the committee reports accompanying it,
emerged from a hard fought compromise involving protracted,
down-to-the-wire negotiations among representatives of authors,
composers, publishers, music publishers, and educational
75
institutions.
Congressman Railsback's description of the Bill during the
1976 House floor debates seems apt: "A good compromise is probably one that satisfies no one, but is acceptable to everyone, and it
69 The usual approach to statutory interpretation is to read ambiguous provisions
in light of the legislation's overall purpose. See, e.g., Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,
250 (1986). Recourse to some overarching statutory purpose in the copyright context,
unfortunately, has proven particularly treacherous. Is the statute's purpose to benefit
authors? To provide incentives for authors to create works? To further public dissemination? Even settling on a particular purpose fails to advance the inquiry appreciably
because what is most unclear is the means Congress chose to achieve its (surely multiple) purposes. Compare Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 170-78 (1985) (Congress did not intend to distinguish direct grants from authors to producers of derivative
works from authors' grants to middlemen) with id. at 186-88 (White, J., dissenting) (derivative works exception intended to protect authors); compare also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984) with id. at 495 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
70
17 U.S.C. § Ill (1982). See, e.g., REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,
supra note 35, at 118-44; 122 CONG. REC. 31,984 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id.
at 32,008 (remarks
71
17 U.S.C. §
in 1976 U.S. CODE
72
17 U.S.C. §

of Rep. Kastenmeier).
108. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, reprinted
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5810, 5813.
115. See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35,

at 246-80; 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 1868 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights).
73
17 U.S.C. § 116. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 111 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); 122 CONG. REc. 3824-26 (1976) (colloquy).
74
17 U.S.C. §§ 601-602. See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra
note 35, at 360-62.
75 See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1789-96 (testimony of Barbara
Ringer, Register of Copyrights); 122 CONG. REC. 31,980-81 (1976) (remarks of Rep.

Kastenmeier).

870

CORAELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:857

has been said that this bill is a compromise of compromises." ' 713 The
House subcommittee drafted a compromise treatment of public television after negotiations between representatives of public television and copyright owners failed; 77 the compromise itself seeks to
encourage continuing negotiations toward voluntary licenses. 78
The invention of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal and the definition
of its jurisdiction were both compromises negotiated by interested
parties and then ratified by Congress. 79 Indeed, the Copyright Office and interested parties hammered out the basic structure of the
80
entire statute before including Congress in the legislative revision.
II
NEGOTIATIONS AND COMPROMISE IN THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
"Really, all interests in this bill are, in one form or another, special interests."
-Representative Kastenmeier 8 t

The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act is, at the very
least, a troublesome aid in determining the statute's meaning. One
can choose a statutory provision almost at random; a review of the
provision's legislative history will show that credit for its substance
belongs more to the representatives of interested parties negotiating among themselves than to the members of Congress who sponsored, reported, or debated the bill. The congressional sponsors
may have given almost no thought to the meaning of the provision.
82
That fact presents a vexing puzzle in statutory interpretation.
Negotiation, brokering and compromise commonly accompany
the enactment of a statute. One might conclude that the participa122 CONG. REC. 31,982-83 (1976).
17 U.S.C. § 118. See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35,
at 154-67, 176; 122 CONG. REc. 31,985 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
78
See 122 CONG. REC. 31,985 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan). In the context of
the Act as a whole, the provision is unusual because members of Congress, rather than
representatives of affected industries, designed the compromise.
79
See 1975 House Htearings, supra note 9, at 734, 757 (testimony ofJack Valenti, Motion Picture Association); id. at 777-80 (testimony ofJohn Summers, National Broadcasting Association); 122 CONG. REC. 3822-26 (1976) (colloquy).
76
77

80

See 1965 House Iearings, supra note 8, at 31-33 (prepared statement of George

Cary, Deputy Register of Copyrights); id. at 1858-59 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights).
81

1975 House learings, supra note 9, at 1853.

Congressional inattention, without more, would not make the puzzle an unusual
one. The substantive content of many statutes receives only cursory attention from individual members of Congress. A probing analysis of the legislative process that generated the 1976 Act, however, demonstrates how significantly it differs from the more
familiar variety of legislation through brokering. See infra notes 83-161 and accompanying text.
82
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tion of industry representatives in the copyright revision process
was simply an extreme case of vigorous lobbying, different in degree, but not in kind, from the process producing most other statutes. Alternatively, one might conclude that the tremendous
influence of industry-negotiated compromises resulted from Congress's passive ratification of the compromises so struck. Both conclusions would be wrong.
The negotiations over copyright revision were not merely incidental to lobbying.8 3 Indeed, Congress consistently resisted lobbying over substantive issues, insisting instead that would-be lobbyists
sit down with their opponents and seek mutually acceptable solutions.8 4 Nor did Congress pass the 21 years of copyright revision
waiting idly for industry representatives to do its work. Members of
Congress worked very hard on the copyright revision bill. They
held repeated, lengthy subcommittee hearings, attended numerous
executive sessions, and drafted a flood of committee reports.8 5
More important, they encouraged, cajoled, bullied, and threatened
the parties through continuing negotiations.8 6 They mediated disputes and demanded that combative interests seek common
ground.8 7 Viable compromises emerged from the interminable negotiations largely because of congressional midwifery.
83
See 122 CONG. REC. 31,985 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan) ("the compromises
in this bill do not represent the kind frequently associated with the legislative process").
The legislative process that I describe may be functionally equivalent in many ways to
the familiar process by which bar association committees, trade associations, or uniform
law commissions negotiate the provisions of bills ultimately submitted to Congress. See,

e.g., A.B.A. SECTION OF PATENT TRADE-MARK AND COPYRIGHT LAv, REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON FEDERAL AND STATE TRADE-MARK LEGISLATION 66 (1938) (A.B.A. committee drafted

proposed trademark statute introduced by Rep. Lanham as H.R. 9041). It is nonetheless atypical for these negotiations to proceed with congressional funding, supervision,
and sponsorship and even more unusual for such negotiations to generate an official
government record of the bargaining sessions. Although administrative agencies in recent years have increasingly relied on industry compromises in framing regulations,
those compromises typically receive only tacit acknowledgement. The official legislative
history of this statute is distinctive in the explicit and officially sponsored character of
the compromises it produced. That difference is itself significant. See infra notes 154-62
and accompanying text.
84 See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 1713 (remarks of Rep. Drinan); id. at
1796 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights).
85 See Kaminstein, The Cnn'en! Status of U.S. Copyright Lau#Revision: An Experiment in
Legislative Technique, 13 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 371 (1966); see also sources cited supra
note 51.
86 See hifra notes 100-44 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., 1965 House Hearings,
supra note 8, at 591 (remarks of Rep. Poff); 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 93
(remarks of Sen. McClellan); 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 193 (remarks of Rep.
Pattison); id. at 363 (remarks of Rep. Drinan); 113 CONG. REC. 8585 (1967) (remarks of
Rep. Celler).
87 See infra notes 104-33 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., 1975 House Hearings,
supra note 9, at 971 (testimony of Edward Cramer, Broadcast Music, Inc.); Copyright Laus
Revision: Hearingson S. 1361 Before the Subcouun. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the
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The incessant pressure to achieve agreement among industry
representatives was deliberate and planned in advance. The Register of Copyrights initially designed the revision process to give compromise among affected interests a central role. The program
began in 1955 with the congressional funding of 35 studies on copyright issues. 88 The Copyright Office circulated the studies among
members of an advisory panel of lawyers representing various parties with interests in copyright revision. After reviewing the panel's
comments, the Register prepared a report. 89 The Copyright Office
then held a series of meetings with the advisory panel, which eventually swelled to include "more than a hundred persons, representing almost everyone who had any real interest in this subject." 90 At
the first of these meetings, the Register explained that his report
contained tentative recommendations intended only to generate
discussion. The Register designed the meetings to reach inter-industry consensus on a proposal before drafting a bill for congressional consideration. 9 1 In his 1965 testimony to the Senate
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Register
Abraham Kaminstein explained:
In the hearings on this bill held before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
HouseJudiciary Committee earlier this year a question was raised
as to why, in view of the fast-evolving communications technology, there have not been more frequent revisions of the copyright
law. If there is a single answer to this question, I believe it is that
there are so many interrelated creator-user interests in the copyright field, and they present such sharp conflicts on individual issues, that the consensus necessary for any general revision is
extremely difficult to achieve. Examples of this difficulty are
found throughout the concentrated efforts to revise the 1909 act
which went on continuously between 1924 and 1940 and which all
ended in failure and futility. Realizing fully what copyright law
revision is up against, Arthur Fisher, my predecessor as Register
of Copyrights, planned a program that would be based on a thorough knowledge of all the issues and a painstaking effort to reSenale Comm. on theJudiciaqy, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Senate
Hearings] (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
88

SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON

THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., I ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION (Comm. Print 1960).
See CLR PART 1, suipra note 56, at x-xi.
89 CLR PART I, supra note 56, at ix.
90
1965 Senale Hearings, supra note 52, at 64 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights).
9 1 CLR PART 2, supra note 54, at 4-5. Indeed, few of the recommendations in the
Register's 1961 Report remained in the Bill that emerged from the pre-legislative meetings, and fewer still remained in the Bill ultimately enacted in 1976. Compare CLR PART

1, supra note 56, with H.R. 11947, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) and Pub. L. No. 94-533,
90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
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solve as many disputes as possible before a bill reached the stage
of congressional hearings. It took us 10 years, but the program he
2
planned has been carried out to the best of our ability.)

After each series of meetings, the Register solicited additional written comments and drafted responsive proposals. 9 3 During the years
of the panel discussions the Copyright Office attempted to iron out
as many disagreements as possible, 9 4 and the Register urged that
more intractable controversies be resolved through further
negotiations .95
By the time the House and Senate subcommittees began holding hearings on copyright revision legislation, the participants in the
pre-legislative dialogue had reached agreement on the bill's basic
structure and approach, 9 6 but many parties were still wrangling
about specifics. 9 7 The Register gave both subcommittees progress
reports, accompanied by a voluminous record of the pre-legislative
process, 98 and explained that many of the bill's provisions were
"carefully worked-out compromises which, while not especially welcome to either side on a particular issue, have proved a satisfactory
way of balancing the interests." 9 9 Members of Congress then joined
the effort to encourage further attempts to reach compromise.' 0 0
During the 1965 House Subcommittee Hearings, for example,
numerous witnesses testified about the controversy over the liability
of jukebox operators for using copyrighted music.' 0 ' Representative Poff urged the jukebox operators to reach a compromise with
composers, 0 2 while Representative Celler, the bill's sponsor, sug92
1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 66. See also REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT, supra note 11, at xii-xiii.
93 See CLR PART 3, supra note 54; CLR PART 4, supra note 54; CLR PART 5, supra
note 52; REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 11, at ix-xvi.
94
1965 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 31-32 (prepared statement of George Cary,
Deputy Register of Copyrights); Ringer, supra note 5, at 479-82.
95 See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 71 (testimony of Abraham Kamin-

stein, Register of Copyrights); see also sources cited supra notes 54.
96 I analyze the bill's basic structure and approach infra notes 170-201 and accompanying text.
97 See 1965 House Hearings. supra note 8, at 1858-59 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights). The compromise package on ownership, duration, and

termination, discussed supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text, was among the settled
issues. See 1965 House Hearings,supra note 8, at 1866 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights).
98 REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,supra note 11; CLR PART 1, supra note 56:
CLR PARTS 2 to 4, supra note 54; CLR PARr 5, supra note 52.
99 1965 Senate Hearings,supra note 52, at 66.
100 See, e.g., 1965 House Hlearings, supra note 8, at 1855 (testimony of Rep. Celler.
Chairman of HouseJudiciary Committee); id. at 1856 (remarks of Rep. Poff): 1965 Senate
llearings. supra note 52, at 93 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
101 See 1965 ttouse IIearings,supra note 8, at 170-219, 537-658, 921-974 (testimony of
various witnesses).
102
Id. at 590-93 (colloquy). See also id.at 59 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
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gested that if the jukebox industry refused to negotiate with composers, the subcommittee should adopt a provision subjecting the
industry to full copyright liability.' 0 3 After the hearings, the Subcommittee and the Register pressured the two groups to reach a
negotiated solution. The Register made suggestions. The members
of the Subcommittee made suggestions. The House Judiciary Committee sent its counsel to meet representatives of thejukebox industry in Chicago about possible bases for compromise.' 0 4 Finally,
after protracted negotiations, the parties agreed on the principle of
royalty payments with a statutory ceiling, but could not agree on a
royalty amount.' 0 5 In April of 1967, after the House had begun debating the revision bill, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
convened a meeting between representatives of the jukebox industry and representatives of composers and publishers and demanded
that they reach agreement. The parties ultimately compromised on
a flat annual royalty of eight dollars per jukebox, paid to and distributed by the Copyright Office. The substance of the compromise was
not what the Register or any member of the subcommittee would
have designed, but they supported it because the parties to the
10 6
agreement found it acceptable.
Even more difficult negotiations ensued over the copyright liability of cable television systems.' 0 7 Sharp controversy arose during
the 1965 House Subcommittee Hearings, and the subcommittee
members drafted a compromise provision that proved acceptable to
no one.' 0 8 Negotiations over the next few years among representatives of broadcasters, cable television operators, and copyright owners yielded no agreement.' 0 9 The Senate Subcommittee drafted
alternative provisions, which drew angry protests."I0 In 1971, Senator McClellan persuaded both the FCC and the White House Office
of Telecommunications Policy to join the fracas." '1 When none of
their compromise proposals to the parties proved agreeable, the
chairman of the FCC and the director of the Office of Telecommuni103
104
105

106

Id. at 1855.
113 CONG. REC. 8592 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
Id. (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
113 CONG. REC. 8992-94 (1967) (colloquy); see also 1975 House Hearings, supra

note 9, at 1885 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); 122 CONG. REC.
3824-25 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Hollings).
107
See generallv REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 11848.
108 See id. at 121-22; H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 77-88 (1966); 113
CONG. REC.

8598-604 (1967) (colloquy).

See S. REP. No. 1168, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968); REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMFENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 127-28.
1 10 See REGISTER'S SECOND SUIPI.EMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 128-29.
I II See id. at 134; 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 87, at 278-280 (prepared statement
I09

of Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Association).
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cations Policy forced what came to be called the "consensus agreement" down the throats of all concerned, and sent the parties back
to Senator McClellan's subcommittee." 2 The Copyright Royalty
Tribunal" 53 originated with the consensus agreement's proposal
that, should the parties fail to agree on a royalty rate, compulsory
arbitration would settle the issue." 14 Perhaps because the participants sensed that their consensus agreement had been coerced,
many remained unhappy with it and with those provisions of the
copyright bill written to reflect its terms.' 15 Negotiations continued,
and the cable and motion picture industries ultimately agreed on
17
their own proposal, 1 6 which the House Subcommittee adopted"
and Congress enacted."I8
The House Subcommittee's general counsel participated actively in the tortuous negotiations on fair use. 1 9 Relentless pressure from House Subcommittee members persuaded the
participants in the negotiations to find a solution on which they
could agree.' 20 The Register's initial report in 1961121 suggested
that the general revision bill give explicit statutory recognition to
the judicially created concept of fair use. The proposal sparked controversy; efforts to draft a provision embodying fair use inspired
greater controversy. 12 2 The Copyright Office tried unsuccessfully to
encourage consensus by organizing meetings between authors, publishers, and educators before the House Subcommittee held hear112 See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 87, at 278-515 (testimony of various witnesses); REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 134-37.
113 See 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).

114

See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 734, 757 (testimony ofJack Valenti,
REPORT, supra note 9,
at 145-47.
1 15 See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 436-90, 700-856 (testimony of variMotion Picture Association); REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY

ous witnesses).

116 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 90-91, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 5705.
117 See id.; 113 CONG. REC. 31,984 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Railsback).
118 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1733, supra note 71, at 75-76, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5816-17. See also 122 CONG. REC. 32,007-08 (1976) (House
debates).
1 1) The fair use doctrine originated as an implied limitation, initially defined by the
courts, on the rights of copyright owners. In 1961, the Register's Report described fair
use as follows: "That term eludes precise definition; broadly speaking, it means that a
reasonable portion of a copyrighted work may be reproduced without permission when
necessary for a legitimate purpose which is not competitive with the copyright owner's
market for his work." CLR PART 1. snlpa note 56, at 24.
120 See, e.g., 1975 House IHearings, supra note 9, at 363 (remarks of Rep. Drinan); id. at
1793 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); 122 CONG. REC. 31,981
(1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
121 See CLR PART 1, slpre note 56, at 25.
122 See 1965 House Hlearihkq, supra note 8, at 37-40 (prepared statement of George
Cary, l)eputy Register of Copyrights).
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ings on the revision bill.1 23 Complicating efforts at compromise was
the fact that the parties disagreed violently about the scope of fair
24
use under then-existing law.1
There was a quite sharp confrontation in 1965 in the hearings between the authors and publishers on the one side, and the Ad Hoc
Committee of Educational Organizations and Institutions on the
other. And the center of the issue was section 107. The ad hoc
committee was urging that it contain a more expanded language,
which referred to teaching, plus a very broad educational exemption.... And the crux of that proposal was that if the activity was
nonprofit, was for no commercial purpose of any kind, and if it
was for the purpose of teaching or scholarship or research that it
be allowed, without any limitations. This was combated very vigorously by authors and publishers .... 125
At the close of the House Subcommittee's hearings, Representative Celler urged the subcommittee to arrange for further negotiations toward a compromise provision. 12 6 Meanwhile, in the Senate,
Senator McClellan demanded that the parties reach a compromise. 127 After long and difficult negotiations convened by the Register and the House Subcommittee's general counsel, the parties
compromised on a proposal that included both statutory language
and a discussion, to be inserted in the committee reports, of how the
fair use privilege would apply in the context of education.' 2 8 In the
next round of hearings, controversy centered around whether the
language in the House and Senate Committee Reports accurately
reflected either the meaning of the compromise language or current
legal doctrine. 129 Parties on both sides of the controversy refused
123
See 1965 House Heatings, supra note 8, at 315-18 (testimony of Harold Wigren, Ad
Hoc Committee of Educational Organizations and Institutions).
124
See, e.g., 1965 House Heming, supra note 8, at 342-44 (prepared statement of
Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc Committee on Educational Institutions and Organizations);
id. at 364-65 (colloquy); id. at 412-17 (testimony of Robert Gerletti, National Education
Association); id. at 1451-53 (colloquy); id. at 1497-1510 (testimony of Ralph Dwan, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.).
125
1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1790 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register
of Copyrights).
126
Id. at 1854-55.
127
See 1965 Setate Hearings, supra note 52, at 93.
128
1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 1790 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register
of Copyrights); see 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 38-42 (testimony of Herman
Wouk, Authors League of America).
129
See, e.g., 1967 Senate Hearings. supra note 52, at 144-46 (testimony of Harold
Wigren, Ad Hoc Committee on Educational Institutions and Organizations); id. at 434
(testimony of Phillip Wattenberg, Music Publishers Association); id. at 640-42 (prepared
statement of American Historical Association); id. at 844 (testimony of Don White, National Audiovisual Association); id. at 903-05 (testimony ofJohn Stedman, American Association of University Professors). Witnesses typically favored the language in the bill,
but disagreed sharply on what the language meant.
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to budge, and the compromise came unglued.' 3 0 At the House and
Senate Subcommittees' insistence, the parties continued to hold negotiations with the hope of reaching another, more durable compromise. They agreed, finally, on the language.' 3 ' They failed,
however, to agree on what the language meant. 3 2 Congress
33
adopted their compromise verbatim.
The history of the 1976 Act's manufacturing clause,' 3 4 which
required domestic manufacture of books written by United States
authors and distributed in the United States, also illustrates Congress's efforts at accommodation. The Copyright Office, the Justice
Department, the State Department, and the Commerce Department
all opposed the manufacturing clause.'3 5 The House and Senate
Subcommittees concluded that little justified the clause in principle,13 6 but were impressed that both those opposing the clause and
those supporting it were willing to compromise. 3 7 Authors, pub130 See 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 1791 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights).
131 See 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 1791 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 33;
122 CONG. REC. 31,980-81 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
132
See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1792-93 (testimony of Barbara
Ringer, Register of Copyrights); 1967 Senate Hearings,supra note 52, at 39 (testimony of
Herman Wouk, Authors League of America); id. at 144-46 (testimony of Harold Wigren,
Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations); id. at 434 (testimony
of Phillip Wattenberg, Music Publishers Association); id. at 844 (testimony of Don
White, National Audiovisual Association); id. at 903-05 (testimony of John Stedman,
American Association of University Professors); id. at 1044 (testimony of Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations); 122 CONG.
REC. 31,985 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
133 The portion of the House Report accompanying section 107 abounds with evidence of partial compromise and incompletely resolved disputes. It makes exceedingly
peculiar reading. The House Report refers to, but does not include, passages from earlier Committee Reports that had sparked controversy. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra
note 16, at 66-67, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 5680. The
House Report then includes verbatim the text ofjoint letters sent to the subcommittee
by representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations, the Authors League of America, the Association of American Publishers, the Music Publishers Association of the United States, the National Music Publishers
Association, the Music Teachers National Association, the Music Educators National
Conference, and the National Association of Schools of Music, along with the text of the
agreements they negotiated regarding the interpretation of the language of section 107
in the context of reproduction for classroom use. Id. at 67-71, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 5680-85.
134
17 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
135
See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 379.
136
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 134 (1967).
137
See id. at 132; S. REP. No. 1168, supra note 109, at 9-10. Authors opposed the
manufacturing clause because it limited their ability to exploit copyrighted works and
led to forfeiture of their copyrights in circumstances that were often beyond their control. Publishers opposed the clause because it substantially increased their publishing
costs. Book manufacturers insisted that the manufacturing clause protected the domestic printing industry against potentially ruinous foreign competition. See generally. 1975
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lishers, and book manufacturers met to negotiate a provision that all
of them could support. 3 8 These negotiations stalled,' '1 and the
House Judiciary Committee drafted a provision embodying the
compromise it believed the parties were approaching. 140 In 1968,
however, representatives of publishers and book manufacturers
reached a different, formal agreement, 14 1 which the State and Commerce Departments strenuously opposed. 14 2 The Senate incorporated the compromise into the revision bill, 14 3 and the Register
reluctantly recommended its adoption. 14 4 Congress went along.
The 1976 debates in both houses of Congress include repeated
paeans to compromise. 14 5 Members of Congress testified in favor of
provisions on the ground that they were compromises, 14 6 and successfully opposed proposed amendments because they would distort those compromises. 14 7 Such veneration for compromise runs
through the entirety of the Act's legislative history. Congress invited, nurtured, and occasionally compelled the compromises embodied in the 1976 Act. Sometimes, it disregarded everyone's
better judgment in favor of giving effect to the agreement of interested parties. Congress welcomed compromise for compromise's
sake.
In some cases members of Congress explained, incommittee
reports or on the House or Senate floor, what they believed the
compromises to mean. In the vast majority of cases, however, they
failed to explain, and many of the extant explanations are general,14 8 superficial,1 49 confusing,' 50 or confused.' 5 ' As often as not,
House Hearings, supra note 9, at 1695-1714 (testimony of various witnesses); REGISTER'S
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 143-50.
138 See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 116 (testimony of Dan Lacy, American Book Publishers Council).
139 See 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 71 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights).
140 See H.R. REP. No. 83, supra note 136, at 131-38; 113 CONG. REC. 8597 (1967)

(remarks of Rep. Roth).
141
142
143
144
145

See REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 362, 369-7 1.

See id. at 387-88.
See id. at 372-74.
Id. at 392.
See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. 3821-24 (1976) (Senate debate); id. at 31,979-85 (House
debate).
146 See, e.g., id. at 3821-22 (Copyright Royalty Tribunal); id. at 31,980-81 (fair use):
id. at 31,984 (cable television).
147 See id. at 32,008 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 3826 (remarks of Sen.
Baker).
148 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16. at 56-57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIIN. NEWs at 5670 (general discussion of distinction between ideas and expression embodied in section 102(b)).
149 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. 31,984 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Railsback on provisions
affecting cable television).
150 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 88-101, reprinted in U.S. CODE
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the reason a specific provision was deemed to be good was that industry representatives had agreed on it.152
III
RECONSIDERING LEGISLATIVE INTENT

"I wish you people would settle your differences and come to us
with a compromise."
53
-Representative Drinan'
A review of the 1976 Copyright Act's legislative history demonstrates that Congress and the Registers of Copyrights actively
sought compromises negotiated among those with economic interests in copyright and purposefully incorporated those compromises
into the copyright revision bill, even when they disagreed with their
substance. Moreover, both the Copyright Office and Congress intended from the beginning to take such an approach, and designed
a legislative process to facilitate it.
One might argue that this was an improper way to create a statute, on the ground that it involved an egregious delegation of legislative authority to the very interests the statute purports to regulate.
Alternatively, one might argue that the process constituted an ingenious solution to the problem of drafting a statute for an area so
complicated that no member of Congress could acquire meaningful
expertise. I will make neither of these arguments here. The worth
of a given legislative process depends, at least in part, on the statute
that the process produces. If courts disregard or misread the statute
in favor of earlier precedent, as I argue they have, it is difficult to
assess the wisdom of the process by which the statute was drafted.
Seeking a consensus among affected industries is a plausible road to
arrive at a statute, and it is the road that Congress took. I suggest
that retracing that road can help clear up the 1976 Act's
ambiguities.
Others have written elsewhere on the appropriate uses of legislative history, and have generated their own normative models of
interpretation. Much of the commentary reflects discomfort with
the degree to which the idea of legislative "intent" is necessarily a
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5702-16 (nearly incomprehensible explanation of compulsory

license for cable television transmission embodied in section 111).
151 See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 31,985-86 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Drinan explaining
the rate set in section 115 for the manufacture of recordings as a royalty for "the right to
play recordings").
152 Cf id. at 31,979 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("For the most part, affected
industries and groups are satisfied with the compromises reached in the bill. I believe
that the fact that the bill was approved by the committee on a vote of 27 to I testifies
vividly to this fact.").
153
1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 900.
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fictional one. 54 Traditional approaches to statutory interpretation
assume that members of Congress draft the statutes that they enact,
know the details of those statutes, and intend their legislation to
achieve particular ends. Concededly, this describes most actual legislative processes inaccurately. It, nonetheless, is generally consistent with the record evidence contained in most legislative histories.
When statutes are written by outsiders, the drafting typically occurs
offstage. Those reading such a statute's legislative history may suspect that the statute was conceived in a backroom bargain, but the
record rarely confirms their suspicions.1 55 Indeed, most legislative
histories support an inference of specific, substantive legislative intent. The legislative record here is a different one. Members of
Congress openly acknowledged their limited substantive expertise
and their largely supervisory role in the drafting process. They emphasized that they had delegated to industry representatives the task
of forging the statute's substantive provisions and they praised the
negotiating process that evolved. Courts have attempted to interpret this legislative history within the context of the traditional fiction of legislative intent. The effort has required them to engage in
intolerable analytical contortions and to disregard much of the probative evidence that the legislative history in fact contains.
Recently, some commentators have suggested that courts
should view statutes as negotiated, enforceable bargains between
lobbyists and legislators.1 56 They see the legislative process as a
"market" in which special interests barter campaign contributions,
5 7
votes, and endorsements in return for favorable legislation.1
Courts, they argue, should interpret and enforce at least some statutes as if they were integrated contracts. 5 8 This economic model
has generated controversy, with detractors responding that courts
See, e.g., MacCallum, supra note 50.
My colleague, Avery Katz, has suggested that any analysis of a statute's legislative
history must differentiate between the "official" legislative history contained in the record and the unofficial back-room bargaining sessions. Unlike Judge Easterbrook, who
would have courts inquire into cloakroom deals, see Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983
Termn-Fou'ard: The Court and the Economic System. 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 17 (1984), Professor Katz would limit legitimate inquiry to that contained in materials actually available to
legislators, if not in fact examined by them. An unusual feature of the legislative history
I have been describing is the detail with which negotiations among representatives of
special interests are described and often reproduced in the official legislative documents. These negotiations are part of the official record. See supra note 83.
156
See Easterbrook, supra note 155, at 18 ("If statutes are bargains among special
interests. they should be enforced like contracts."): I.andes & Posner. The Independent
Judiciary in an terest-Group PerpectiVe. 18J.I.. & ECON. 875 (1975).
157
See Landes & Posner, supra note 156. at 877 ("In the economist's version of the
interest-group theory of government, legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that
outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation."); Macey. supra note 69. at 231 n.42.
158
See Easterbrook, supra note 155. at 46, 51.
154
155
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have an implicit obligation to discourage special interest legislation.1' I allude to the controversy to clarify what I am not saying.
The participants in this debate use the concept of a negotiated bargain metaphorically. I do not. Commentators debating the market
model distinguish between record evidence, i.e., the contents of the
official legislative history, and extrinsic evidence of the bargaining
process.1 60 The bargains that I have described are well documented
in the official record. Finally, the market model-representing
groups of special interests striking deals with venial legislators, or
lobbying as market activity-fits the 1976 Copyright Act poorly.
The negotiated bargains in the 1976 Act were struck not between
legislators and lobbyists1 6' but among representatives of opposing
interests precisely because Congress publicly and on the record demanded that they sit down and agree.
I offer no alternative metaphor or competing model. My own
position is that the legislative history of a statute is helpful if, and to
the extent that, it yields useful information about what the drafters
intended the statutory language to mean and why the legislature enacted it. Whether and how the legislative history of any particular
statute proves illuminating depends on the particular statute involved and the process that accompanied its enactment. Maxims
and models of interpretation 16 2 may or may not be probative of
what a particular legislative history can offer in the way of illumination. The 1976 Act is an unusual statute; the process of its enactment was itself unusual. Congress's approach to enacting a modern
copyright statute reflects an exceptional willingness to adopt particular language because industry representatives had agreed on it. If
the reasons industry representatives agreed on that language and
their interpretations of what the language meant can illuminate the
statutory language, then considering their story will yield a useful
interpretive tool.
That possibility is especially attractive in the context of the
1976 Copyright Act because courts need this additional tool. The
statute is facially ambiguous, complicated, and confusing. Courts'
attempts to apply the plain meaning rule have left them per-

151) See Macey, supra note 69, at 264-65. See also Tribe, ConstilutionalCalruils: Equal
Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592, 593-98 (1985) (utilitarian methodologies tend to overlook or ignore non-market values). Instructively, participants on both
sides of this debate appear to argue that courts should examine the record legislative
history to discern whether a given statute fits the model.
160 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 69, at 253-55.
161
Indeed, the parties to these bargains included representatives of many interests
that lacked the funds to hire lobbyists and that made no campaign contributions.
162 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 69, at 264.
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plexed. 635 Traditional searches for legislative intent have compounded the problem. 1 64 A rash of commentators have sought to
provide guidance by articulating broad normative principles that describe how a copyright system should operate and inviting courts to
use them as prisms through which to focus the inquiry. 16 5 These
normative theories, however, share a common disregard for the
statutory provisions with which courts must work. Although such
theories may offer guidance to Congress in deciding how next to
revise the copyright law, they say little about what Congress in fact
wrought in 1976. Courts could, of course, continue to decide copyright cases as if the 1976 Act merely codified judicial interpretation
of the 1909 Act; indeed, some courts have. 166 This approach disregards the most emphatic evidence of substantive congressional intent available: the repeated statements of a purpose to replace the
antiquated 1909 statute with a modem one. 167 Moreover, it means
that huge numbers of people will have labored for 21 years in vain.
Ultimately, to understand the language of the 1976 Act, one must
look to the understanding of the people who agreed on the compromises reflected in the statute. That insight is vital to deciphering
the statute's complexities.
IV
CONSTRUING THE 1976 COPYRIGHT STATUTE
"Of course, sir, as you know, both the phrasing in the bill and the
163
See, e.g., Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 633 (2d Cir.
1982) (Newman, J., concurring) ("It is simply not clear from the statute or the regulations who must receive notice of termination, and the legislative history offers no
guidance.").
164
See supra notes 41-75 and accompanying text.
165
See, e.g., Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 1, 38-43 (1984); Denicola, Applied Art and IndustrialDesign: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983); Goldstein, Derivative Rights and
Derivative Works in Copyright, 30J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 209 (1983); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
166
See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text. The common law of statutory
copyright was itself not uniform during the revision process. For example, courts disagreed sharply on the scope of copyright protection due works involving historical facts.
Compare, e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) with e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181
F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1950). Courts concluding that the 1976 Act essentially codified prior
law have not distinguished among the myriad lines of conflicting cases from which Congress might have chosen. Instead, courts appear to assert that, by codifying prior law,
Congress confirmed that court's own prior views of the conflicts.
167
See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings,supra note 52, at I (remarks of Sen. McClellan: "I
personally have no preconceived opinion about any provision of this bill. My sole objective in introducing it was to devise a modern copyright statute that would encourage
creativity and protect the interest which the public has in the subject matter of this legislation."). See also, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 31,979 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); id.
at 31,982 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id. at 33,813 (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
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discussion in the House report are the outcome of many meetings

with both sides."

68
Herman Wouk 1

I have thus far described the 1976 Act's negotiations and compromises with little attention to the substantive content of the bargaining. I now return to two of the many compromises embodied in
the statute, the fair use provision and the ownership compromise
package, to examine what the legislative history of these provisions
reveals about their content. The fair use provision resulted from
elaborate, protracted, down-to-the-wire negotiations conducted
under congressional sponsorship. The ownership compromise
package, on the other hand, was settled before Congress began considering the legislation. Both illustrate the interrelationship between the bill's overall structure and each of the substantive
compromises negotiated over the years. Both demonstrate the influence that compromise in one dispute had on the negotiations in
others. Finally, both compromises have generated important litigation in the years since the 1976 Act took effect.
A.

Fair Use

Although the final wording of the fair use provision did not
emerge until the last moment of the revision process, 169 the parameters of the fair use dispute were fixed by the early agreements on
the statute's structure and approach. By the time the House Subcommittee held its first series of hearings in 1965, the Copyright
Office and industry representatives had devised a structure and approach that almost everyone supported.170 The nature of that structure and approach represented precisely what one might have
expected to evolve from negotiations among parties with economic
interests in copyright. The bill granted authors expansive rights
covering any conceivable present and future uses of copyrighted
works, and defined those uses very broadly. It then provided specific, detailed exemptions for those interests whose representatives
had the bargaining power to negotiate them. All uses not expressly
exempted remained within the control of the copyright owner. The
bill, therefore, solved the problem of defining the rights in uses
made possible through future technology by reserving those rights
to the copyright owner.171 Because exploiters of yet-to-be-invented
168

169

1967 Senate Hearings,supra note 52, at 39-40.

See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
170 See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 31-33 (prepared statement of George
Cary, Deputy Register of Copyrights); id. at 1858-59 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights).
171 See 1965 House Heaings, supra note 8, at 32-33 (prepared statement of George
Gary, Deputy Register of Copyrights); REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note
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communications technology were the very parties who could not be
present at the bargaining table, there was nobody to argue that the
bill's basic structure gave them too little consideration.
The 1909 Act, in contrast, had granted authors rights that were
subject to many more intrinsic limitations. 72 For example, the
1909 Act limited the copyright owner's exclusive right of public performance in non-dramatic works to performance for profit. The
Supreme Court further limited the performance right with a narrow
construction of "performance" in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc. 173 and Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken. 174 In his
1961 Report, the Register of Copyrights recommended retention of
the 1909 Act's "for profit" limitation. 75 Industry representatives,
however, objected strongly to the proposal, and the Register drafted
an alternative provision, replacing the broad "for profit" limitation
with specific narrow exemptions.' 7 6 The Register also drafted expansive definitions of "perform" and "perform publicly."
Furthermore, the 1909 Act had, for the most part, extended
federal copyright only to published works.' 77 Most unpublished 7 8
works were protected, if at all, under state "common law copyright."' 179 The state common law copyright regime offered authors
substantially broader protection than federal statutory copyright: 8 0
in many states, a work that remained unpublished received perpetual protection, free from the intrinsic limitations of statutory copyright. The "for profit" limitation, the privilege of fair use, and even
11,

at 13-25; accord Brown, The Joys of Copyright, 30J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 477, 479 (1983);

B. KAPLAN, supra note 7, at 101.

172
173

See, e.g., Ringer, supra note 5, at 484.
392 U.S. 390 (1968) (cable television transmission of copyrighted television programs not a performance); see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (importation of "distant" cable television signals from one
community into another not a performance).
174 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (playing radio broadcast through restaurant loudspeakers

not a performance).
175 CLR PART 1, supra note 56, at 27; see REGISTER'S
note 11, at 21.
176

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT,

supra

CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 135-57; REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra

note 11, at 14.
177 Section 12 of the 1909 Act permitted copyright registration for unpublished
works belonging to particular categories.
178 Under the majority of courts' constructions of the 1909 Act a work was published
if copies of it had been distributed to the public.
179 The term "common law copyright" describes the protection afforded unpublished works by state statutes or case law. The 1909 Act expressly left the protection of
most unpublished works to state law, and thus established a dual system of copyright
whereby the federal statute protected published works while state law protected unpublished works. See W. STRAUSS, PROTECTION OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS 8-15 (1957), reprinted
i SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION

180

See generally Kernochan, supra note 37.

(Comm. Print 1960).
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the distinction between idea and expression were generally deemed
inapplicable to common law copyright. 18 1 Common law copyright
protection, however, was alienable without formalities, easily forfeited, and, therefore, significantly more fragile than statutory copyright. 1 82 The revision bill extended statutory copyright to all works
upon creation, 8 3 a change viewed by authors' representatives as a
substantial gain.' 8 4 It pre-empted state copyright law' 8 5 and made

federal protection automatic and subject to statutory limitations regardless of publication or other dissemination of the work.' 8 6 Finally, the bill extended the duration of that protection dramatically.
These benefits for copyright owners did not come without cost.
Many industry representatives implicitly predicated their support of
the revision bill's basic structure on the inclusion of satisfactory exemptions for the interests they represented. 18 7 Each of the parties
whose economic interest in copyright was more akin to use than to
investment sought to negotiate for itself the broadest specific exemption possible.' 8 8 The ensuing negotiations over these exemptions produced statutory privileges for uses that would have
constituted copyright infringement under the 1909 Act. 18 9 Furthermore, authors' representatives reluctantly agreed to proliferation of
the compulsory license device and its restriction of copyright owners' exclusive rights.' 9 0 As enacted, the statute contained provisions
See id.
182 See, e.g., Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, 287 N.Y. 302, 307-08, 39 N.E.2d
249, 250-51 (1942).
183 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 201 (1982).
181

184

See REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 82. Initially, the Regis-

ter proposed keeping the dual system, but changing the dividing line between state and
federal protection from "publication" to "public dissemination," thereby affording statutory protection to works that are exploited without distribution of copies, such as television programs. Everyone objected: "[The overwhelming sentiment was definitely in
favor of a single Federal copyright system with protection starting upon creation, and
with a limited term for all works, published or unpublished, disseminated or undisseminated." Id.
185
17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 83.
187 See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings,supra note 8, at 380-86 (testimony of Lois Edinger,
National Education Association); id. at 1138-43 (testimony of Julian Boyd, Society of
186

American Archivists); id. at 1144-49 (testimony of John Banzhaf, Computer Program
Library); id. at 1157-59 (testimony of Maxwell Freudenberg, U.S. Air Force).
188 See, e.g., id. at 342-417 (various witnesses testifying in favor of a broad educational exemption).
189 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 112; 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 1748-67 (various
witnesses); H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 101-05, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5716-20.
190

See, e.g., 1975 House Hemings, supra note 9, at 968-69 (testimony of Bernard Kor-

man, ASCAP); see generally Ringer, Copyright in the 1980s-The Sixth Donald C. Brace Menmorial Lecture, 23 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 299 (1976).
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for four compulsory licenses in place of the 1909 Act's one.""
In the midst of these expansively defined rights and rigid exemptions, the fair use doctrine became the statute's central source
of flexibility. In the earliest versions of the bill, the beleaguered fair
use provision offered the sole means of tempering the expansive
scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.1 9 2 Fair use was also
the sole safe harbor for interests that lacked the bargaining power to
negotiate a specific exemption. In 1969, the Senate Subcommittee
added a second provision limiting the general scope of copyright.
This second limitation was the distinction between idea and expression, a fundamental principle of traditional copyright law codified in
section 102(b) "in response to the great debate over computers.
[The provision was] intended to disclaim any intention to protect a
programmer's algorithms under the bill."' 9 3 These two provisions
remained the only general limiting principles in the statute as enacted in 1976.
Successive versions of the fair use provision and the language
of the committee reports accompanying them were increasingly ambiguous. Indeed, the final version did one thing while claiming to
do another. By agreement of the representatives of interested parties, the statute and ultimate House committee report simultaneously define fair use in ways that depart significantly from many of
the parties' understanding of that doctrine as articulated in prior
case law,' 9 4 and insist that the provision's goal was "to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."' 95 The key to understanding what the parties
believed they were bargaining over lies in the fair use doctrine's
structural significance.
191

17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 116, 118.

192

See REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 25-28.

193
REGISTER'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 35, at 10. See 1967 Senate
Hearings, supra note 52, at 197 (testimony of Prof. Arthur Miller, Ad Hoc Committee of
Educational Organizations and Institutions); id. at 1058-60 (testimony of W. Brown
Morton, Jr., EDUCOM, Interuniversity Communications Council).
194
See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 1772 (testimony of Harry Rosenfield, Ad
Hoc Committee of Educational Organizations and Institutions); id. at 1859-60 (testimony of Abraham Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights); 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note
52, at 39-40 (testimony of Herman Wouk, Authors League of America); id. at 434 (testimony of Phillip Wattenberg, Music Publishers Association); id. at 844 (testimony of Don
White, National Audiovisual Association); id. at 1044-46 (testimony of Harry Rosenfield,
Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Organizations and Institutions); 1973 Senate Hearings,
supra note 87, at 193 (remarks of Richard Schoeck, Modern Language Association); 1975
House Hearings, supra note 9, at 268-345 (various witnesses); H.R. REP. 1476, supra note
16, at 65-74, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 5679-87.
'95
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs at 5680. The late Professor Nimmer remarked on this inconsistency. See
Nimmer, Preface-The Old Copyright Act as Part of the Aev .At, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 471,
473 (1977) ("[Olne may question the House Committee's statement of its intent.").
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The bill's structural solicitude for copyright owners' interests in
uses made possible through technological advances ran counter to
the Supreme Court's tendency to hold newly developed technologies exempt under prior copyright statutes.' 9 6 By limiting future
technology's exemptions to those available under the fair use provision, the bill restricted the impact ofjudicial creativity on the copyright owner's bundle of rights. Because the parties viewed the
concept of fair use as inherently flexible and fact-specific, 9 7 they
felt that a court's ruling establishing that a particular use was fair
and not infringing might not create a firm exception; a court could
still impose liability for the same sort of use in a later case with different facts.
Representatives of copyright owners, therefore, preferred that
the fair use doctrine represent the only flexibility principle in the
statute's complex scheme of expansive rights and rigid exceptions. 198 Educational organizations went along only on the condition that the statutory definition of fair use restrict the doctrine's
unpredicability' 9 9-the very feature that authors and publishers
found attractive. 20 0 Copyright owners had long claimed that much
of what educational users were doing and wanted to continue doing,
including most educational photocopying, was not within the fair
use exception. 20 ' Educational organizations were unwilling to accept a definition of fair use unless it were stretched to include educational photocopying and other common educational uses. The
parties agreed to insert words here and there, in both the statutory
provision and the House Committee Report, that appeared to
stretch the fair use privilege enough to offer educators some minimal certainty. The language on which they compromised, however,
196
See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394
(1974) (cable television); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908) (piano rolls).
197
See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 86 (testimony of Harold Wigren,
Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations); id. at 105-06 (prepared statement of John Schulman, American Bar Association); 1965 House Hearings,
supra note 8, at 364-65 (colloquy).
198 See supra note 119; see also, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 360-61 (remarks of Invin Karp, Authors League of America); 1973 Senate Hearings,supra note 87, at
114-71 (various witnesses). See generally Brown, supra note 171, at 479.
199
See, e.g., 1975 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 273-74 (testimony of Leo Raskind,
American Council on Education); id. at 295-302 (testimony of Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc
Committee of Educational Organizations and Institutions).
200
See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 8, at 130-31 (testimony of Horace
Manges, American Book Publishers Council); CLR PART 5, supra note 52, at 103 (remarks of Invin Karp, Authors League of America).
201
See, e.g., 1973 Senate Hearings,supra note 87, at 844 (prepared statement of Don
White, National Audiovisual Association); id. at 1053-54 (testimony of Horace Manges,
American Book Publishers Council); 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 311 (prepared
statement of Bella Linden, Association of American Publishers).
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was ambiguous, and intentionally so, because copyright owners and
educational organizations never fully resolved their disputes. Both
interests envisioned flexible application of the fair use doctrine, but
they failed to reach a consensus as to the doctrine's scope.
B.

Issues Surrounding Ownership

At the same time that interested parties agreed on the bill's basic structure and approach, they were also negotiating a compromise on the intertwined issues of copyright ownership, duration,
and reversion. 20 2 The provisions of the ownership package that
emerged differed from the law that developed under the 1909 Act in
significant respects. In one respect, the difference was uncontroversial: the new provisions narrowed the potential for uncertainties
surrounding ownership to cloud copyright titles and impede copyright exploitation. 20 3 Proposals to tinker with who owned the copyright evoked more controversy.
The 1909 Act left initial ownership of copyright to state common law copyright doctrine. Upon publication, whomever state law
deemed to be the owner could register her copyright for an initial
20 5
term of 28 years. 20 4 After the initial term, the work's author
could renew the copyright for a second 28 year term. One of the
features of the 1909 Act's renewal provision was its reversionary
purpose: unless the work were a work made for hire, the renewal
term vested in the work's creator despite any grants made during
the initial term. 20 6 In 1943, however, the Supreme Court eviscerated the reversionary feature of renewal by holding that the ex20 7
pectancy of a renewal term was assignable.
See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying notes 211-35. The provisions for automatic vesting
of statutory copyright, divisibility of ownership, recordation of transfers, relaxation of
notice requirements, cure of notice defects and the proposed definitions of works made
for hire and joint works all advanced this goal. See generally REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT, supra note 11, at 66-78, 99-112. Indeed, the principle of clarifying copyright
ownership to remove obstacles to exploitation came to pervade the 1976 Act.
204
The owner of the copyright under state law might or might not be the author of
the work. See generally J. GUINAN, supra note 56.
205
The renewal right vested in the work's author without regard to whether she had
been the initial copyright proprietor. Although state law might determine the identity of
the initial copyright proprietor, see supra note 204, federal copyright law governed the
issue of the identity of a work's author.
206
See generally J. GUINAN, supra note 56.
207
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). The first
federal copyright statute gave the renewal right to an author's "assigns." Act of May 31,
1790, 1 Stat. 124. Subsequent statutes, however, including the 1909 Act, omitted "assigns" in order to permit the author to renegotiate the terms for the work's exploitation.
See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909). In Fisher, Justice Frankfurter,
writing for the majority, nonetheless concluded: "[N]either the language nor the history
of the Copyright Act of 1909 lend support to the conclusion that the 'existing law' prior
202
203
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Early in the pre-legislative dialogue, authors and composers
proposed a single copyright term, measured by the author's life.
They also, however, proposed resurrecting the reversionary feature
of the renewal term. 20 8 Publishers and motion picture studios favored a single term precisely because it would eliminate any
20 9
reversion.
In 1965, representatives of authors, composers, book and music
publishers, and motion picture studios negotiated a solution by
redefining works made for hire 2 10 and excluding works made for
hire from the provisions enabling an author to recapture rights in
her works. Case law had elaborated the 1909 Act's works made for
hire provision into a multi-factor test for determining when an employer who paid someone else to create a work would be deemed
the author and entitled to the copyright. The old test began with
rebuttable presumptions and proceeded to consideration of an assortment of factors deemed probative of employers' and employees'
intentions. 2 11 The new definition distinguished between works prepared by employees within the scope of their employment and
works prepared on commission. Works prepared by employees
were automatically works made for hire and copyright vested in the
employer. Although an employer could, in writing, assign her copyright interest to the employee, the work would remain a work made
for hire. Employers and employees could not, by contract, provide
that the work would not be made for hire. Correlatively, the intention of employer and employee as to whether the work were to be
one made for hire would be irrelevant. Employers, and their successors in interest, would no longer face employees' belated claims to
copyright ownership. 21 2 Courts and commentators have recently
to 1909, under which authors were free to assign their renewal interests if they were so
disposed, was intended to be altered." 318 U.S. at 656.
208
See, e.g., CLR PART 2, supra note 54, at 93 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors
League of America); CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 285-87, 293-94 (remarks of Irwin
Karp, Authors League of America).
209
See, e.g., CLR PART 4, supra note 54, at 34 (remarks of Horace Manges, American
Book Publishers Council); CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 283 (remarks ofJulian Abeles,
Music Publishers' Protective Association); CLR PART 2, supra note 54, at 87-88 (remarks
ofJoseph Dubin, Universal Pictures Co.); id. at 104 (remarks of Thomas Robinson, Motion Picture Association of America).
210
See supra note 56. For a general discussion of works made for hire under both the
old and the new statutes, see Angel & Tannenbaum, llorks Vade for Hire Under S.22, 22
N.Y.L. SCi. L. REv. 209 (1976).
211
See B. VARMER, supra note 56, at 128-30. Whether a work was made for hire
turned on the intention of the parties and the degree to which the purported employer
initiated and reserved the power to supervise it. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp.
847, 856 (D.NJ. 1981). Evidence of common industry practice was highly persuasive. See
id. A parallel body of case law existed under state common law copyright involving unpublished works of authorship. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 5.03[B].
212
See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cet. denied
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found the question whether a work was created by an "employee,"
as defined in the 1976 Act, a complex one. 2 13 But the content of the

pre-legislative dialogue 21 4 and the context in which it occurred 21 5
indicate that by using the term "employee" the parties meant to
limit works made for hire under this branch of the definition to
works created by a salaried worker in a long-term position.
Commissioned works received different treatment. A commissioned work could be a work for hire only if it belonged to one of
several enumerated categories and only if the commissioner and
contractor agreed in writing that the work would be deemed made
for hire. This two-pronged definition replaced the fluid common
law of rebuttable presumptions with a more certain provision
backed up with a statute of frauds. The limitation of commissioned
works to specifically enumerated categories, and the choice of those
categories, can be traced in the legislative history to two competing
concerns. Authors' representatives worried that freelance authors
lacked the bargaining power to reject contractual clauses designating works as made for hire.2 16 Publishers and motion picture studios, on the other hand, were concerned about the multiple
obstacles that the reversion provisions could pose to the exploitation of a particular class of works that were normally created by independent contractors paid a flat fee, but that common industry
practice had long deemed works for hire.2 17 The groups compromised by limiting commissioned works for hire to the specific classes
409 U.S. 997 (1972). The renewal provisions of the 1909 Act led to many cases filed
litigating whether a work had been made for hire. See, e.g., Epoch Producing Corp. v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); see
generally Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 210, at 216-20.
213
See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 551-53 (2d Cir.),
cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 15, at § 5.03[B]; i'fra notes
266-77 and accompanying text.
214
See CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 267 (remarks of E. Gabriel Perle, Time, Inc.);
CLR PART 5, supra note 52, at 144-46 (remarks of Barbara Ringer, U.S. Copyright Office); see also sources cited supra notes 55-57.
215
In 1965, when the parties reached this compromise, courts had not yet extended
the scope of works made for hire to include commissioned works. That particular line of
cases developed in the decade to follow. See Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 210, at
228-32; i:fra text accompanying notes 272-75.
216
See, e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 52, at 146-48 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors
League of America); id. at 150 (remarks of Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc Committee on
Educational Institutions and Organizations); id. at 151 (remarks of Leon Kellman, American Guild of Authors and Composers).
217
See, e.g., CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 290-92 (remarks of Bella Linden, American Textbook Publishers' Institute); id. at 297 (colloquy); CLR PART 4, supra note 54, at
248-50 (written comments of American Book Publishers Council); CLR PART 5, supra
note 52, at 146-52 (colloquy); id. at 155-56 (remarks of Irwin Karp, Authors League of
America). Eliminating the role of industry practice in the determination may have
achieved some unintended results. See DuBoff, An Academic's Copyrighl: Publish and Perish,
32J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 17, 32-34 (1984).

1987]

1976 COPYRIGHT ACT

891

of works, typically created by multiple authors, that publishers and
motion picture studios had cited in objecting to earlier proposals to
limit works made for hire to works created by employees. 2 18
The design of the "reversion" provision involved further compromise. Under the courts' construction of the 1909 Act, reversion
occurred automatically upon the expiration of the initial 28-year
copyright term, but authors could assign their renewal expectancies
in advance. 2 19 Failure to register for a renewal term within a year
caused the copyrighted work to enter the public domain. 2 20 Authors' representatives sought to replace the renewal provisions with
either an outright limitation on the duration of any transfer 2 21 or an
inalienable automatic reversion. 2 22 Publishers and motion picture
companies opposed both proposals. 2 23 The Register advanced a
number of alternative proposals that satisfied no one. 2 24 After protracted negotiations, industry representatives met one another halfway. Subject to the revised definition of works made for hire, 22 5
which were not subject to termination, the parties agreed on a provision permitting authors to terminate transfers. 226 Unlike the 1909
218 See, e.g., CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 297 (colloquy); CLR PART 2, supra note 54,
at 357-59 (written comments of Motion Picture Association of America).
219 See B. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT 166 (1960), repintedin SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION (Comm. Print 1960).

220 See supra note 56 and sources cited therein. The renewal term vested in the author, if living, and in designated statutory beneficiaries if the author had died. In practice, book publishers and motion picture companies (but not popular music publishers,
see ifra note 226) required authors to assign their renewal expectancy at the same time
they assigned the initial term of their copyright. Publishers and motion picture studios
did not typically pursue alternative statutory beneficiaries to obtain assignments of their
contingent renewal expectancies. If the author survived the initial term, the publisher or
motion picture company would own the copyright for both terms, a total of 56 years. If
the author died before the initial term expired, the renewal term would vest in the statutory beneficiary after 28 years, divesting the publisher or motion picture company of any
rights. Failure to file for renewal caused forfeiture of copyright protection. See generally
B. RINGER, supra note 219, at 105.
221
See, e.g., CLR PART 2, supra note 54, at 238-39 (written comments of American
Guild of Authors and Composers); id. at 248, 258-59 (written comments of Authors
League of America; 20-year term); id. at 319 (written comments of Irwin Karp).
222
See, e.g., id. at 413 (written comments of Writers Guild of America).
223 See, e.g., id. at 104-05 (remarks ofJoseph Dubin, Universal Pictures); CLR PART 3,
supra note 54, at 281-83 (remarks of Horace Manges, Joint Copyright Committee of the
American Book Publishers Council and the American Textbook Publisher Institute); id.
at 292 (remarks of A.H. Wasserstrom).
224
See supra notes 56-57.
"2'2. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
226
See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1965) (earlier version of 17 U.S.C.
§ 203). The parties envisioned that the termination of transfer provisions would, unlike
renewal, preserve the author's option to terminate notwithstanding any contract. Also
unlike renewal, termination would not occur automatically and would not divest the proprietor of a derivative work of the right to continue exploiting it. The parties did contemplate that any intermediaries' rights would revert to the author on termination. See,
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Act's renewal provisions and the proposals of authors' representatives, termination was not automatic and, in fact, involved a complicated and cumbersome procedure. Also, unlike the 1909 Act's
renewal provisions, the author's right to terminate would be inalienable, as the authors' representatives had requested. On the question of when the author could terminate, the parties split the
difference. Authors had initially suggested a 20-year period, but settled for a five-year, use-it-or-lose-it window, commencing 35 years
after the transfer. 2 27 A parallel provision was drafted allowing the
author to recapture the windfall nineteen-year extension of renewal
228
term in subsisting copyrights.
The parties also included in their compromise the Register's
e.g., CLR PART 5, supra note 52, at 222 (written comments ofJulian Abeles); CLR PART 3,
supra note 54, at 281-82 (remarks of Horace Manges, American Book Publishers CounciI); id. at 318-19 (written comments ofJulian Abeles). See also Abrahms, supra note 37, at
228-32 (citing additional evidence). It is not surprising that book publishers, music publishers, and motion picture studios agreed to the compromise package despite this construction; they were all somewhat better off under the compromise package than under
then-current law. Popular music publishers, for example, had been operating for nearly
20 years under a uniform popular songwriter contract negotiated with the American
Guild of Authors and Composers that standardized royalty division and limited assignment of copyright to either the initial or renewal term. See CLR PART 5, supra note 52, at
154 (remarks of Phillip Wattenberg, Music Publishers Association); CLR PART 3, supra
note 54, at 297 (remarks of Phillip Wattenberg). Thus, any period exceeding 28 years
before authors could recapture their copyrights represented an increase in exploitation
time for music publishers. They agreed on a period of 35 years. 17 U.S.C. § 203(3)
(1982). The motion picture studios' position under the derivative works exception improved substantially compared to then-current law. See Abrahms, supra note 37, at 23031; Melniker & Melniker, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the New Copyright Law,
22 N.Y.L. Scn. L. REV. 589, 615-17 (1977). Furthermore, book publishers received the
benefit of a definition of works made for hire tailored to fit their needs.
227
H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a)(2) (1965) (earlier version of 17 U.S.C.
§ 203(a)(3)). See REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 71-76. See generally Melniker & Melniker, supra note 226. Barbara Ringer, the former Register of Copyrights who actually drafted the provision, recently testified that she understood it to
subject the interest of all intermediaries to the author's termination. Civil and Criminal
Enforcement, supra note 37, at 90-92.
228
H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304(c) (1965) (earlier version of 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(c) (1982)). See REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 95-96. Interestingly enough, the idea of reversion of the extended renewal term in subsisting copyrights provoked much less controversy than the proposals for reversion generally.
Perhaps publishers and motion picture companies, who invoked freedom of contract
arguments in opposing reversion, were sensitive to the fact that in buying the initial and
renewal terms of subsisting copyrights, they paid for no more than 56 years. But see CLR
PART 5, supra note 52, at 178 (remarks of John Schulman, Consultant on Copyright to
Christian Science Church) (arguing that assignments made since Register prepared
1961 Report contemplated the possibility of extended renewal term and fixed the consideration on that basis); CLR PART 2, supra note 54, at 279 (written comments ofJoseph
Dubin, Universal Pictures) (arguing that assignments contemplating extensions of the
renewal term should be given effect); id. at 353, 360-61 (written comments of Motion
Picture Association of America) (reversion of renewal term allows author to demand a
windfall profit).
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proposal to permit the proprietor of a derivative work to continue
exploiting it after termination of the grant. 2 29 The proposal had
originated with the motion picture industry's objection that reversion would prevent the showing of films unless producers negotiated new licenses, and that the right to prevent the further
exploitation of expensive, valuable properties would permit the
23 0
owners of reversion interests to demand unreasonable terms.
The derivative works exception substantially mitigated the motion
picture industry's opposition to reversion. Music publishers, however, were less easily mollified because they viewed the exception as
benefitting "everyone acquiring rights under a copyright other than
the publisher who, in the case of a musical or literary work, is the
one who has stimulated such demand therefor. ' '23 l Indeed, the vehemence of publishers' opposition to reversion, even when modified by the derivative works exception, indicates that they
envisioned that reversion or termination would divest publishers
and other intermediaries of any interest whatsoever in the copy23 3
music
righted work. 23 2 Yet, because of the authors' concessions,

and book publishers as well as the motion picture industry were, in
the context of common industry practice, substantially better off
under the compromise provision than they were under the analogous provisions of the 1909 Act. 23 4 Authors and composers re-

ceived in return the assurance that their rights of termination could
not be alienated in advance. In that regard, they too were better off
23 5
than under the 1909 Act.

C.

Interpreting the Bargains

The most striking impression that emerges from a consideration of the substantive content of these negotiations is the degree to
which they interrelate. The terms of compromise on one provision
were intertwined with ongoing negotiations over several others, and
later set the parameters of dispute for still others. Thus, each of the
statute's many provisions is best understood in the context of what
had already been conceded and what remained to be settled at the
229
H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 304(c)(3) (1965) (earlier version of 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(c)(6)(A) (1982)).
230
See CLR PART 2, supra note 54, at 360-61 (written comments of Motion Picture
Association of America). See generally Melniker & Melniker, supra note 226, at 611-18;
Abrahms, supra note 37, at 230-32.
231
CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 319 (written comments ofJulian Abeles).

232

See supra note 226.

233
234
235

See supra text accompanying notes 210-28.

See supra note 226; Melniker & Melniker, supra note 226, at 610-18.
See 1975 House Hearings,supra note 9, at 1889 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Reg-

ister of Copyrights) (every change from current law with respect to ownership is in authors' favor).
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time that the negotiating parties agreed to its terms. The parties
agreed on the Act's structure and approach quite early, but predicated their agreement upon finding future compromises for other
provisions. Later agreements were subtly and less subtly defined by
earlier ones.
Courts have traditionally approached copyright cases with few
preconceptions or biases. They have viewed the balancing of interests required in framing copyright legislation as a quintessentially
congressional preserve. 2 36 Congress, for its part, chose to balance
these interests by seeking and then enacting a network of negotiated
compromises. If courts were to interpret the statute by determining
whether they could give those compromises effect, they would necessarily need to consider what the parties to the compromises believed their agreements meant. The resulting construction would, if
nothing more, work Congress's will. Perhaps courts, commentators,
or indeed Congress itself would thereafter conclude that the legislative process underlying the 1976 Act balances competing interests
in an inappropriate or undesirable fashion. Courts might plausibly
respond by reinterpreting the 1976 Act to preserve as much as possible the balances reached by the law that preceded it.237 Alternatively, they might conclude that the bargaining process itself
suggests useful paradigms for interpretation. Some of the bargains
codified in the statute may merit enforcement according to the intent of the bargaining interest groups. Other bargains may invite a
different approach. I would argue that the compromises embodied
in the statute are of two different varieties, and the two sorts of bargains merit different treatment. One kind of bargain involves copyright ownership; the other addresses the nature and scope of
copyright rights. The keynote of the statute's ownership provisions
is a commitment to facilitation of transfer and exploitation of copy236
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) ("As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to
authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product."); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir.
1979) ("Congress has authority to make any law that is 'necessary and proper' for the
execution of its enumerated Article I powers. ... including its copyright power, and the
courts' role in judging whether Congress has exceeded its Article I powers is limited."),
cerd. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
237
Professor Dan Rosen, building upon the work of Guido Calabresi, has suggested
that the velocity of technological development necessitates the use of common law
methodology to update the 1976 Copyright Act. See Rosen, .- Common Law for the Ages of
Intelleclual Properv. 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769 (1984). Using similar methodology to revive
principles the legislature revised or discarded is another commonly encountered variation. Although I would argue that both forms ofjudicial nullification are inappropriate,
I concede that a legislative process of the sort that I have described may present an
unusually tempting opportunity for the practice.
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rights by removing uncertainties over copyright ownership. 238 The
statute of frauds provisions in the definition of works made for hire
and the restrictions surrounding the right of termination are only
some of the statutory provisions aimed at reducing clouds on the
titles of copyright that could impede exploitation. 2 39 The ownership package commends itself as a particularly attractive candidate
for enforcement as the bargainers intended. The deal does not address the balance of interests between copyright owners and users;
instead, it determines who owns the copyright. The parties crafted
the package to fit the realities of an assortment of markets for copyrighted works in the various industries that buy and sell them. Arguably, the collected industry representatives were the only body
with the expertise to design such a compromise. And, once the bargain has been enacted, judicial revamping of copyright ownership
provisions threatens to undermine the certainties that the com2 40
promises sought to supply.
The compromises that involve the scope of copyright rights
pose a more difficult problem. The 1976 Act's structural expansiveness is balanced by few general limiting principles and a host of
rigid, stingy, specific exemptions. This design for carrying copyright into the future poses intrinsic conflicts once the future is at
hand. Unless the few general limiting principles are interpreted at
least as broadly as the grant of rights, copyright in works employing
24
new media will translate into expansive rights without exceptions. '
238 A corollary is the statute's efforts to concentrate copyright ownership in the
hands of those deemed most likely to exploit them.
239 Other such provisions include the more restrictive definition of joint works, see
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), and the provisions permitting divisibility of ownership, see 17

U.S.C. § 201(d).

240 To the extent that issues of copyright ownership depend on case-by-case common law analysis, the benefits will probably redoupd to the party with the greatest funds
to pursue litigation. Thus, a flexible judicial approach to ownership issues would be
likely to shift the balance struck in the ownership compromise package in a consistent
direction: away from individual authors.
241
The statute's two general limiting principles, described supra notes 169-201 and
accompanying text, are the fair use doctrine codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 and the distinction between idea and expression codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Because they are the
sole general limiting principles in a statute structured to resolve unanticipated or unresolved problems in the copyright owner's favor, they arguably require interpretation
with particular attention to their functional significance within the statute's overall structure. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 37, at 570-98. The tensions between an impulse to
effectuate the intent of the parties and concern for the public policy implications of enforcing a statute drafted by private interest groups, see, e.g., Macey, supra note 69, at 26465, may be greatest where the statute's overall structure and approach demonstrate that
future, unanticipated interests lacked representation in the bargaining process. See supra
notes 170-97 and accompanying text. I will argue in a future article that the 1976 Act's
structural expansiveness requires courts to interpret the statute's few limiting principles
with concomitant expansiveness in order to preserve the balance that the statute seeks

to achieve.
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Whether or not the parties who actually negotiated the content of
the 1976 Copyright statute intended that the distinction between
idea and expression and the privilege of fair use be interpreted expansively, the statute's structure requires it in order for the statute
to function effectively.
Others may read the evidence differently, or rely on the record
of compromise to discredit completely the courts' resort to legislative history in copyright cases. But, taking a hard look at the legislative process to ascertain what balance its participants believed that
they had struck seems a necessary antecedent to such an evaluation.
V
THE

"Rather ....

1976

ACT IN THE COURTS

we believe and hold that Congress intended the prior

law in such situations to remain unchanged."
24 2
-Judge Wilfred Feinberg
In the years since the 1976 Act took effect, courts and commentators have shown an abiding fondness for the court-embroidered
provisions of the superseded 1909 Act. Many courts have concluded, with little analysis, that the new statute codified the case law
decided under the old one. 243 Others have ignored the provisions
of the 1976 Act, and referred, without explanation, only to prior
cases. 244 Still others, often without explicit reliance on prior case
law, have used common law reasoning to reintroduce into the 1976
24 5
Act legal doctrine it purports to leave behind.
Courts' preference for old cases over the provisions of the complicated new statute has produced a gradual distortion of the compromises embodied in the new law. Courts' treatment of fair use
and of questions related to ownership, discussed earlier, provide
good examples of this distortion.
The Supreme Court recently considered the fair use doctrine in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises24 6 and relied upon
242 Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.
469 U.S. 982 (1984).
243 See, e.g., Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th
Cir. 1985) (1976 and 1909 versions of § 103(a) not materially different), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1061 (1986); Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1984); Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) ("the legislative history indicates
the revision was not intended to change the scope of copyright protection under the
previous law"); National Business Lists, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89,
92-93 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (1976 Act "largely a codification of prior law").
244 See, e.g., Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 994-95 (9th Cir. 1983); Rotardier v.
Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See, e.g., Gracen v. The Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
245
246
471 U.S. 539 (1985). The Nation magazine printed an article describing the then
unpublished memoirs of President Gerald Ford, and illustrated its article with a large
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1909 Act case law that the new statute had left behind to reshape the
fair use privilege. The Court looked to the language in the House
Committee Report purporting to intend to restate the doctrine of
fair use without change, and on other, less apposite legislative history, 24 7 to read the pre-empted doctrine of common law copyright
back into the statute. 24 8 Yet, there is little question that insofar as
Congress may be deemed to have intended anything at all, it intended to make rights in unpublished works subject to the limitations set forth in the statute, including fair use, and to pre-empt
state law protection in favor of a single, uniform system. 24 9 The remarks in the Committee Reports regarding Congress's intent to restate fair use without change should be understood as a
counterweight to language demanded by the educational lobbies
that seemed to expand fair use's scope. 250 By misinterpreting the
Committee Report's statement as preserving common law's inhospitality to fair use, the Court drew upon state common law copyright
decisions to revive the dual system that the statute purported to
251
abolish.
Even more disturbing, the Court used a set of fair use presumptions that truncates the statutory inquiry. "[E]very commercial use
of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of
the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copynumber of short excerpts. Harper & Row, the publisher of the memoirs, sued the Nation for copyright infringement. The Nation argued that its use of excerpts was within
the fair use privilege. The Supreme Court disagreed. The decision has been criticized
on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 37; The Supreme Court, 1984 Tern,:
Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 292-302 (1985).
247 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found evidence of congressional intent to preserve a special immunity from fair use for unpublished works in two sources.
See 471 U.S. at 552-54. The first was language in the 1961 Register's Report. That
language was written in support of the Register's early proposal to preserve common

law copyright for undisseminated works. The proposal proved extremely unpopular
and was soon abandoned. Justice O'Connor's second source was language in the Senate
Report, intended to accompany the Senate fair use provision, but written before the
negotiating parties reached their last-minute compromise. The House Report. written
after the compromise and reflecting its terms, omits the language, although it refers to
it. See supra note 133. Congress adopted the House's version of the fair use provision
rather than the Senate's. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1733, supra note 71, at 70, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5811.
248 Common law copyright, discussed earlier, was a state law regime that offered

unpublished works perpetual copyright protection that was not subject to the privileges
and limitations of federal statutory copyright. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying
text.
249)

See. e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 129-33, reprinlted in 1976 U.S. ConE
REPORT, supr"a note 11. at

& ADMIN. NEWS at 5745-49; REGISTER'S SUI'PI.EMENTARY
86. See generally Kernochan, supra note 37, at 4-6.
250 See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
251
See limper & Rou', 471 U.S. at 551.
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right."2 5 2 Noncommercial uses, in contrast, are presumptively
fair.2 53 These twin presumptions, which in theory simply shift the
burden of proof but in practice tend to dictate the result of the fair
use inquiry, 2 54 were first announced by the Supreme Court in 1984
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 2 55 They are the

25 6
Court's own invention: it relied on no prior cases to derive them.
But their flavor resembles that of the 1909 Act's for-profit limitation
25 7
on the performing right, which the 1976 Act explicitly abolished.
And, as articulated, they may render all non-profit performances
presumptively fair uses. 25 8 During the revision process, various witnesses proposed a provision making all non-profit uses presumptively fair.2 59 The compromise provision that Congress enacted
instead contained no such presumption until the Court read one in.
Authors may be disturbed to discover that they received less
from their bargain than they thought. But the Court's twin presumptions are disturbing in more fundamental ways. As discussed
earlier, 2 60 all concerned viewed the fair use inquiry as inherently
flexible and fact specific. The legislative history refers to it throughout as an "equitable rule of reason." 2 6 1 Concededly, such an ad hoc
252 Id. at 562 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1984)).
253
254

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).

If a use is commercial, the defendant, to prevail, must prove that her use will not
harm the market for the copyrighted work. Alternatively, if the use is non-commercial,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's use will harm the market for the copyrighted work in order to prevail. In practice, both plaintiffs and defendants have found
the burden of proof on this issue impossible to carry. See, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v.
Fronteer Directory Co., 640 F. Supp. 386 (D. Minn. 1986).
255 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
256 Indeed, prior to the 1976 Act, almost all fair use case law involved commercial
uses. This fact figured significantly in the controversy between copyright owners and
educational organizations over the appropriate scope of fair use in educational contexts.
See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 87, at 193 (remarks of Richard Schoeck, Modern
Language Association).
257 A common, although probably indefensible, interpretation of the 1909 Act, disputed by the Register of Copyrights and never tested in the courts, permitted non-profit
copying as well as non-profit performance. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings.snpra note 8, at
1506 (testimony of Ralph Dwan, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.); 1967 Senate
Hearings, supra note 52, at 1044-46 (testimony of Harry Rosenfield, Ad Hoc Committee
of Educational Organizations and Institutions).
258 See Louisiana Attorney General's Opinion, No. 84-436, 1985 Copyright L. Dec.
(CCH) 25,833. But see Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ariz. 1985) (nonprofit
public performance of unpublished works not fair use because fair use does not apply to

unpublished works).
251) See. e.g., 1975 lonse Ilearings. supra note 9, at 131 (testimony of Irwin Goldblum,
Justice )epartment); id. at 277-78 (testimony ofJames Harris, National Educational Association); 1965 HIIouse Hearings. sttpra note 8, at 416; REGISTER'S SECOND S1'PIM.EMENTRY REPORT, supra note 35, at 21.
260 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
26 1
See, e.g.. REGISTER'S SECOND S1uI'II.MFNT,\RY REPORT, supra note 35, at 29: H.R.
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attitude poses difficulties. Relying on courts to make equitable, factspecific determinations inevitably involves judicial assessments of
the value of the allegedly infringing works, despite the long copy26 2
right tradition hostile to such assessments in other contexts.
This, in turn has led to application of the privilege in a contentbased fashion that left counter-cultural users holding the short end
of the stick. 263 That tendency in the law has been troubling, and
one virtue of the twin presumptions is that their mechanical nature
may reduce the opportunity for biased evaluation. Such a cure,
26 4
however, is likely worse than the disease. The rigid presumptions
are unworkable. A copyright scheme needs flexibility, and the 1976
Act reposes most of that flexibility in its fair use provision. 26 5 The
Court's reformulation of fair use has restricted its availability for
commercial uses, removed its flexibility and tilted the balance between owners and users to the copyright owners' advantage.
Recent decisions concerning ownership have, if anything, been
less faithful to the statute's legislative history and more inclined to
266
hearken back to earlier law. In Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced a conflict between
the 1976 Act's definition of works made for hire 2 67 and its own preREP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at

5679.
262
See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Mitchell
Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980); Clemons, Author v. Parodist. Shiking a Compromise, 46 OHIO ST. LJ.
3, 10 (1985).
263
Conipare,e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) with, e.g., Elsmere
Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Columbia
Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
264
See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D.
Minn. 1985), aft'd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987):
Radji v. Khakbaz, 607 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (D.D.C. 1985),jdgement amended hi part br No.
Civ. A. 84-0641 (D.D.C. May 15, 1987).
265
Because the rigidity of the dual presumptions makes them unworkable, lower
courts are already developing disingenuous evasions. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d
432 (9th Cir. 1986); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986).
266
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). The case involved a
copyright infringement suit by a wholesale dealer in figurines against a retail catalogue
dealer. The plaintiff had commissioned unicorn figures from companies in Japan and
Taiwan. Neither the foreign companies nor their employees were employees of plaintiff.
and unicorn figurines are within none of the specially enumerated categories in that
portion of the definition of works made for hire applicable to commissioned works.
Plaintiff nonetheless registered copyrights in the figures as works made for hire. The
defendant sold substantially similar figurines through its catalogues. Plaintiff sued. and
defendant challenged plaintiff's ownership of copyright in the figurines.
26i7 A "work made for hire" is(l) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
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viously created definition. It resolved the conflict by cleaving to earlier doctrine and mangling the statutory language to fit. The court
interpreted the 1976 Act's definition of works made for hire to cover
three situations. Under the first branch of the definition, a work was
made for hire if created by a regular employee. Under the second
branch, a work was made for hire if specially commissioned, within
the listed categories, and designated a work for hire by a written
instrument. Finally, under thefirst branch of the definition, a work
was made for hire if it was specially commissioned, rather than created by an employee, and the commissioning party actively supervised the contractor's work. 268 The court relied on a line of cases
decided between 1966 and 1975 that held that parties who commissioned works could be employers within the meaning of the 1909
Act's provision covering works made for hire.2 69 The court's interpretation strains the statutory language, and renders all but meaningless the requirement of a written instrument and the limitation to
specific enumerated works in the second branch of the definition.
Why did the court adopt this construction? 2 70 Because, according to the court:
Nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicates that
Congress intended to dispense with this prior law applying to the
concepts of 'employee' and 'scope of employment'.... Had Congress intended . . . to narrow the type of employment relation-

ships within the work for hire doctrine to include only 'regular'
employees, it is unlikely that there would 7have
been no discussion
2 1
of this change in the legislative history.
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument that the work shall be
considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The subsection defines a "supplementary work" to include forwards, editorial notes and illustrations used as an adjunct to work prepared by another
author. Id.
268 See Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 551-53.
269 See id. at 552.
270
Professors Latman, Gorman, and Ginsburg have suggested that the decision is a
prime example of a hard case making bad law. Failure to hold the work one made for
hire might have caused a forfeiture of the copyright under the 1976 Act's national origin
provisions. See A.

LATMAN,

R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES

242 n.5 (2d ed. 1985).
271 41don Accessories, 738 F.2d at 552. See also Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp.
828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) ("it is clear that section 201(b) .

.

. expresses the legislative

intent not to overturn the line of cases which, in favor of more rational decisions in the
copyright area, eschew the more traditional distinctions between an employee and an
independent contractor"). In Peregrine, the court further obliterated the distinction between works created by employees and specially commissioned works by finding that the
work's creator was an independent contractor, and then holding the work to be made for
hire under the first branch of the definition. Id.
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This misreads the evidence. The provision itself was drafted in
1965. The substance of its treatment in the House Committee Report upon which the Second Circuit relied was drafted in 1966.272
Yet the line of cases finding employment relationships in situations
in which works were commissioned began in 1966.273 It is therefore
not surprising that the early legislative history omits mention of any
change in the meaning of the term "employee," although plenty of
discussion indicates that everyone involved understood the term to
mean someone working for an employer in a salaried job, and un274
derstood the term to exclude freelance workers completely.
There is no indication that anyone involved in copyright revision
later became aware of the line of cases expanding the work made for
hire doctrine. 27 5 Indeed, because the work made for hire definition
was part of a settled compromise package, it received little mention.
Because the Second Circuit's reinterpretation of the work made for
hire doctrine requires a fact-specific determination of the exercise of
actual control, it is even less predictable than the 1909 Act test. 27 6
Aldon Accessories undermines the statutory effort to make copyright
ownership more certain. Other courts, however, have found the
277
Second Circuit's reasoning persuasive.
Something similar happened in Mills Music v. Snyder.2 78 At issue
was whether a composer who terminated a transfer to a publisher
was entitled to the royalties that the proprietor of a derivative work
agreed to pay for the derivative work's exploitation. As discussed
earlier, 27 9 publishers and composers indicated several times during
272 See H.R. REP. No. 2237, supra note 108, at 114-16 (1966). The 1976 Reports
contain a shortened version of the 1966 discussion. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note
16, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5736-37.
273 See Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 210, at 229.
274 See, e.g., B. VARMER, supra note 56, at 130 ("all the cases have involved salaried
employees who received either a fixed salary or a minimum salary plus commission");
CLR PART 3, supra note 54, at 257-75 (remarks of various witnesses).
275 Nor was the court's assumption that Congress would flag any change from prior
law in its Committee reports a sound one. Other changes that the 1976 Act indisputably
made in preexisting law also went unremarked. The automatic vesting of copyright
upon fixation, for example, escapes explicit mention.
276 Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1987) ("The
rule of Aldon Accessories makes business arrangements exceedingly difficult.").
277
See, e.g., Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986); Community for Creative Non-violence v. Reid,
652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.D.C. 1987); Marshall v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 647 F. Supp.
1326 (N.D. Ill. 1986). But see Easter Seal Soc'y. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 331-34
(5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting rule of Aldon Accessories).
278 469 U.S. 153 (1985). Mills .lhtsic was a skirmish over rights in the song "Who's
Sorry Now?" The composer assigned copyright in the song to a music publisher who
licensed various records in return for royalties. After termination of the composer's
grant to the publisher, the publisher claimed a continuing right to collect the royalties
payable by the recording companies for sales of recordings of the song.
279

See supra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
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negotiations over the termination provisions that they believed that
an author's termination would divest publishers and other in28 °
termediaries of any interest whatsoever in the copyrighted work. )
Publishers agreed to the provision because of other concessions
they received in the compromise package. In MVills M1usic, the Court
reviewed much of the provision's history. The Court nonetheless
imputed to Congress a purpose to prevent authors from divesting
their assignees of proceeds from the exploitation of derivative works
by third parties, effectively reversing what the parties expected their
compromise to accomplish. 28 ' Thus, an author who terminates a
transfer burdened by the transferee's assignment of the right to create derivative works may receive very little back. With this interpretation, the Court did to the right of termination essentially the same
thing as it had done to the 1909 Act's renewal provision 42 years
earlier. 2 2 With termination, as with renewal, the author's recapture
expectancy is essentially alienable. In industries such as music publishing where authors and composers typically assign to the publisher the right to license any further uses, the statutory right to
terminate will have little value. As with the renewal term, the author
will have assigned most of what is valuable in her work to people
from whom she will be unable to recapture it.
Alone, each of these cases may work only a small distortion.
Taken together, however, they have fundamentally altered the delicate balance of compromises that run throughout the 1976 Act. To
the extent that they signal a trend, they raise a threat of systemic
distortion of the statute. Congress could, of course, rush in to repair the damage. Members of Congress have introduced bills to
overrule Aldon Accessories2813 and Mfills Mlusic. " 84 Alternatively, courts
280 Professor Nimmcr argued that the author's grant to publishers should survive
termination insofar as the publisher has licensed derivative works, but supported his
argument with rather peculiar logic. According to Professor Nimmer. if the author's
assignment to an intermediary was in fact more favorable to the author than the intermediary's assignment to the proprietor of the derivative work, then the author would
receive less after terminating the transfer than she received before termination. See 3 M.
NI,,MER, supra note 15. § 11.03113131 at 11-18.5. Professor Nimmer apparently discounted the fact that, unlike renewal, termination is voluntary. An author would have
no reason to engage in the complicated procedure for terminating her transfer if she
stood to lose by doing so. Nimmer did note that his interpretation, which the Supreme
Court agreed with in Milills Music. would produce an anomaly in the music publishing
context. See id. at 11-18.2 n.8 1. Record companies who avail themselves of the statute's
com)ulsory license to make phonorecords must, after termination, pay the statutory royalties to the terminating author rather than the music publisher. Record companies who
instead "negotiate" a voluntary license on essentially the same terms will, afier termination, continue to pay royalties to the music publisher.
281
469 1.S. at 170-76.
282 See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons. 318 U.S. 643 (1943): suna note
207 and accompanying text.
283 See S. 1223, 100th Cong.. Ist Sess. (1987): S. 2330. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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could begin to construe the 1976 Act in light of the statutory
scheme as a whole and the interrelated negotiations that produced
it.
CONCLUSION

I have alluded in this article to the legal fiction of congressional
intent, which assumes that statutes are written by members of Congress, in language intended by members of Congress to embody
specific, substantive choices that members of Congress have made.
Viewed through that prism, the 1976 Copyright Act is particularly
elusive. An analysis of the statute's legislative history demonstrates
why this is so. Members of Congress revised the copyright law by
encouraging negotiations between interests affected by copyright,
by trusting those negotiations to produce substantive compromises,
and by ultimately enacting those compromises into law.
This process yielded a statute far more favorable to copyright
proprietors than its predecessor, containing structural barriers to
impede future generations' exploitation of copyrighted works. The
legislative process may have struck an unwise balance, but it, nonetheless, is a balance that members of Congress and myriad industry
representatives worked many years to achieve. It is also a balance
around which the represented industries have since structured their
relationships. Courts, in their confusion over the statutory language, have undermined this balance. They have dismantled the
statute's delicate compromises, not systematically, but with unpredictable randomness. As courts distort each bargain, it becomes
more difficult to discern the rationale of other interdependent
provisions.
I have suggested that in interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act,
courts should approach statutory ambiguities by trying to ascertain
the nature of the compromise that an ambiguous provision represents in the context of the ongoing negotiations. Instead, a number
of courts have resorted in their confusion to familiar principles of
prior law. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect overworked federal
courts to wade through the plethora of evidence in search of the
meaning of various compromises. 28 5- But a number of courts and
commentators are already sifting through the statute's legislative
history with an exceedingly fine sieve. 28 6 Moreover, the essence of
See H.R. 3163, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
See Macey, supra note 69, at 239 ("Judges interpret statutes, they are not investigative reporters."). Nonetheless, should the courts demonstrate receptiveness to such
analysis, a cottage industry of scholars and litigants would probably spring up to illuminate the question of statutory meaning for them.
286, See, e.g., Mills Music v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); id. at 176-81 (White. J..
284
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the various negotiations appear in the most basic of the legislative
documents: the Register's reports and the Congressional committee
reports to which many courts and commentators already refer. 2 7
What is needed, then, may be no more than a shift in emphasis, a
reorientation in attitude, for courts to begin to look at the statute's
provisions in the context of the negotiations that developed them.

dissenting); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417. 463-81
(1984) (Blackmun, J.. dissenting); Abrahms. supra note 37, at 204-32; Samuelson, Conii
Revisited: The Case .-gaihst Copyqright Protertion for Computer Prograus in Mahine Readable
Form, 1984 DKE L.J. 663. 692-705 (1984).
287
See, e.g.. sources cited supra note 39.

